SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

BWB&O Expands to North San Diego

December 09, 2019 — Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara is excited to announce our expansion to North San Diego County. Our new office location in Encinitas is strategically located between our Newport Beach and Downtown San Diego offices. The new North San Diego office will provide further resources to better serve our clients. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara

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Extrinsic Evidence, or Eight Corners? Texas Court Sheds Light on Determining the Duty to Defend

December 18, 2022 — Nathan A. Cazier - Payne & Fears
Last year, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a narrow exception to the state’s eight-corners rule, and allowed the consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the duty to defend. The exception arguably raised more questions than it resolved. Last month, a Texas federal court answered some of these questions by rejecting an insurer’s attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence under the newly minted exception. Texas permits few, if any, deviations from its eight-corners rule, which determines an insurer’s duty to defend by only considering the operative pleading and the terms of the policy, without any regard to extrinsic evidence or facts. This protects policyholders by erring on the side of defending claims, even if coverage is questionable. In Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Bitco Gen. Ins. Corp., 640 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex. 2022) (“Monroe”), the Texas Supreme Court adopted an exception to the eight-corners rule, holding that extrinsic evidence may be considered when an “information gap” between the pleading and the policy makes it impossible to determine coverage, but only in limited scenarios where the extrinsic evidence (1) goes solely to an issue of coverage and does not overlap with the merits of liability, (2) does not contradict facts alleged in the pleading, and (3) conclusively establishes the coverage fact to be proved. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Nathan A. Cazier, Payne & Fears
Mr. Cazier may be contacted at nac@paynefears.com

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Congratulations to Partner Nicole Whyte on Receiving the Marcus M. Kaufman Jurisprudence Award

September 30, 2024 — Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
On Thursday, September 19th, BWB&O Partner Nicole Whyte and her fellow recipients Michael Ermer and Hon. Kirk Nakamura (Ret.) were honored at this year’s Jurisprudence Awards Dinner, a fundraiser benefitting the Anti-Defamation League! Thank you to BWB&O Co-Founder and Nicole’s longtime business partner and friend Keith Bremer for his thoughtful introduction and for presenting her with the award, and to BWB&O’s team who joined the event to support Nicole Whyte. Since 1993, the Anti-Defamation League has presented the Marcus M. Kaufman Jurisprudence Award to attorneys who make exceptional contributions to the legal profession and community. ADL’s mission is to stop defamation and secure justice and fair treatment for all people. To learn more about ADL, please visit adl.org Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Dolores Montoya, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP

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Oracle Sues Procore, Claims Theft of Trade Secrets for ERP Integration

November 25, 2024 — Jeff Yoders - Engineering News-Record
Oracle, Inc., has sued Procore in federal court in Northern California, accusing the construction management platform provider of stealing confidential information related to developing enterprise resource planning products for contractors. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jeff Yoders, ENR
Mr. Yoders may be contacted at yodersj@enr.com

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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.

February 10, 2012 — CDJ STAFF

Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”



The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”



A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”



Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”



All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.



Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”



In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”

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California Builders’ Right To Repair Is Alive

March 19, 2014 — David J. Byassee - Ulich & Terry LLP
The California Supreme Court surprised everyone on December 11, 2013 when it denied Brookfield Homes’ request for review of the ruling in the case of Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2014) 219 Cal.App.4th 98, which was decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District Division Three (Orange County). In that case the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act aka SB800 is not the exclusive remedy for a homeowner seeking damages for construction defects that have resulted in property damage. Under the ruling, homeowners may choose to sue builders under common law theories of liability such as strict liability and negligence, in addition to liability under the Act. This ruling made homeowners' compliance with the prelitigation requirements of the Act optional and thereby put builders' “right to repair” in jeopardy. The ruling undermined the expectations of California's homebuilders who, for the past decade, understood that their liability is limited by the Act and that they have a right to repair. Since the Liberty Mutual case was handed down, the topic has become a hotbed item with several divisions of the Court of Appeal. On February 19, 2014, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District Division Three (Los Angeles County) issued a ruling against Premier Homes in the case of Burch v. Superior Court 2014 Cal.App.LEXIS 159 that, without independent analysis, simply adopted the holding in the Liberty Mutual case. But on February 21, 2014, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District Division Four (Los Angeles County) ruled in the case of KB Home Greater Los Angeles, Inc. v.Superior Court 2014 Cal.App.LEXIS 167 that a homeowner's failure to give the builder an opportunity to inspect and repair a construction defect excused the builder's liability under the Act. Additionally, the Court of Appeal went out of its way to state it had ruled earlier in that case that the Act is the exclusive remedy. The various rulings lay a foundation for ultimate intervention by the California Supreme Court. In the meantime, these opposing cases will be cited by counsel for homeowners and builders alike for opposing positions as they continue to navigate construction defect disputes. Mr. Byassee is a strategic litigator specializing in representation of builders and developers. For more information regarding dispute resolution procedures under SB800, Mr. Byassee may be contacted at (949) 250-9797 or by email at dbyassee@ut-law.com. Published courtesy of David J. Byassee, Ulich & Terry LLP Read the court decision
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California Precludes Surety from Asserting Pay-When-Paid Provision as Defense to Payment Bond Claim

December 21, 2020 — Nicholas Korst - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
In a recent case in California, the Court of Appeals held that a surety who had issued a public works payment bond cannot rely on the “Pay-When-Paid” provision in the subcontract as a defense against the subcontractor’s claim against the payment bond.[1] The case was a public works project in Kern County, CA where the North Edwards Water District (the “District”) hired Clark Bros., Inc. (“Clark”) as the general contractor to build an arsenic removal water treatment plant. Clark hired subcontractor Crosno Construction (“Crosno”) to build and coat two steel reservoir tanks. The subcontract included the following “pay-when-paid” provision, which provided a definition of “reasonable time”: If the Owner or other responsible party delays in making any payment to the Contractor from which payment to Subcontractor is made, Contractor and its sureties shall have a reasonable time to make payment. “Reasonable time” shall be determined according to the relevant circumstances, but in no event shall be less than the time Contractor and Subcontractor require to pursue to conclusion their legal remedies against the Owner or other responsible party to obtain payment, including (but not limited to) mechanics lien remedies. (emphasis added). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Nick Korst, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mr. Korst may be contacted at nicholas.korst@acslawyers.com

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More Thoughts on “Green” (the Practice, not the Color) Building

February 01, 2021 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
It has been a while since I “mused” on the green building landscape. While I am a LEED AP and have presented on green (read “sustainable”) building in the past, I am not totally sold on LEED as the be all end all in sustainable construction (the USGBC is a private rating organization that, like the rest of us, is imperfect). I’ve also discussed, both here and elsewhere, the potential risks that come with any new(ish) building process. A recent post by my fellow construction attorney Matt Bouchard (@mattbouchardesq) piqued my interest and started me thinking yet again. Matt’s recent post, entitled Is the U.S. Green Building Council Becoming a Not-So-Jolly Green Giant? outlines recent developments in the sustainable building world (remember “green” is not a specification, but a color), and some of the debate out there among those in the know. From a great infographic on the Top 10 LEED states (Virginia is 3rd) to some sniping from the USGBC (read the LEED folks) toward the GBI (Green Globes) to the fact that LEED is losing some traction as the primary governmental green building certification platform, Matt’s post is worth a read. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

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