Beware: Hyper-Technical Labor Code Violations May Expose Employers to Significant Claims for Penalties under the Labor Code California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA)
May 10, 2017 —
Angela Reston-Nunez – Newmeyer & Dillion LLPMost employers know that companywide policies or practices that do not strictly comply with applicable state or federal employment laws can expose employers to class action lawsuits by large numbers of employees seeking recovery of massive sums in damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. Unfortunately, traditional class action lawsuits are not the only representative actions employers should be concerned with. Recent litigation trends have shown that California’s lesser known Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) can be equally, if not more harmful to employers than class actions due to steep penalties for minor violations.
WHAT IS PAGA?
Under PAGA, “aggrieved employees” can sue employers for alleged Labor Code violations. Like class actions, a PAGA plaintiff sues on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other workers. However, unlike class action plaintiffs, PAGA plaintiffs do not seek damages; rather, they seek civil and statutory penalties formerly recoverable solely by state agencies in enforcement actions.
The distinction between recovery of damages in class actions and recovery of penalties in PAGA actions reflects the often-insidious nature of PAGA claims. While workers have long alleged “derivative” PAGA claims for penalties in connection with more substantive underlying Labor Code violations (meal or rest break violations, for example), we have seen a recent spike in PAGA suits alleging hyper-technical Labor Code violations with no underlying substantive violation, and where the “aggrieved employees” have suffered no actual harm.
WHAT'S AT STAKE?
Equally troubling for employers is the method by which significant penalties are aggregated. With a few significant exceptions, penalties generally range from $50 to $250 per violation. At first blush, this may not seem like much, however total penalties rise rapidly when considering that calculations are made on a per-employee and a per-pay period basis.
AN EXAMPLE ON HOW PAGA WORKS
Consider the following example based on one recent case:
Issue: An employee brought a PAGA-only lawsuit on behalf of himself and 400 other “aggrieved employees” against his employer for alleged Labor Code violations.
Claim: The employee claimed the employer’s 30-year practice of paying employees 9 days after the close of the applicable payroll period violated Labor Code Section 204(d), which requires payment to be made within 7 days of the close of the payroll period. The employee claimed that, under PAGA, the employer was liable for a minimum penalty of $100 per employee, per pay period, going back at least one year (the statutory limitations period for PAGA claims).
Exposure: With 400 employees, 24 pay periods per year, and $100 per violation, the plaintiff sought a minimum of $960,000 in penalties (not including substantial attorneys’ fees, costs and interest also available under PAGA), despite offering no evidence of harm suffered by the employees or prior notice of the issue.
OTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to a draconian penalties scheme, there are a myriad of additional aggravating factors for employers involved in PAGA litigation, such as:
- PAGA plaintiffs are not required to meet the rigorous class certification standards required of class action plaintiffs, meaning plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more likely to bring meritless “strike suits” aimed at obtaining quick settlements based on significant alleged penalties exposure.
- 75% of PAGA penalties recovered by way of settlement or judgment are directed to the state of California, while the "aggrieved employees” only keep 25%, reinforcing the notion that PAGA claims are frequently attorneys’-fee-driven, rather than for protecting employees.
STEPS FOR EMPLOYERS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES
Fortunately, there are a number of measures employers can take prior to and during wage and hour litigation which can dramatically reduce, or even eliminate, exposure to substantial penalties and damages. This includes:
- Regular reviews. Prior to litigation, we recommend regular detailed reviews of company policies and practices in order to identify areas of possible concern and ensure compliance with California’s ever-changing labor laws.
- Take action. On receipt of a new PAGA claim, taking immediate action to remedy an alleged violation within the Labor Code’s 33-day “safe harbor” time-period may help limit an employer’s exposure, and could bar a plaintiff from filing suit at all.
- Be aggressive. Once a PAGA or class action claim is in litigation, a proactive, aggressive approach to claim evaluation, investigation and litigation is critical.
For these reasons and more, it’s in an employers’ best interest to monitor these issues closely and seek input when appropriate.
Angela Reston-Nunez is a labor and employment attorney in Newmeyer & Dillion’s Walnut Creek office. For questions regarding PAGA, class action or individual wage and hour issues, or other employment law matters, please feel free to contact Angela Reston-Nunez at (925) 988-3249 or angela.reston-nunez@ndlf.com.
About Newmeyer & Dillion
For more than 30 years, Newmeyer & Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, construction and insurance law, Newmeyer & Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client’s needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer & Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949-854-7000 or visit www.ndlf.com.
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HOA Foreclosure Excess Sale Proceeds Go to Owner
August 15, 2022 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogOver the last few years, the Arizona Court of Appeals wrestled with the question of who should receive the excess proceeds from a foreclosure sale. We’ve blogged about some these past unreported decisions
here and
here. Those decisions, somewhat inexplicably, required excess sale proceeds to be paid to senior creditors. As we noted at the time, these unreported (and non-precedential) decisions did not seem to make much sense in the context of debtor/creditor rights. Thankfully, a reported opinion finally sets the record straight. Excess sale proceeds should be paid downstream.
In
Tortosa Homeowners Assoc. v. Garcia, et al., No. 2 CA-CV 2021-0114 (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2022), the Court of Appeals held that after the foreclosing lienholder is paid in full, then the excess sale proceeds should be paid to claimants in the order of their priority after the foreclosing lienholder. In other words, if a junior lienholder forecloses, then any creditors behind (i.e., junior to) the foreclosing creditor should be paid, and if all such creditors are paid, then the rest should be given to the owner. Creditors senior to the foreclosing creditor should not be paid anything from the foreclosure sale. This makes sense from a policy perspective, because the senior creditor retains its lien against the property and the bidder presumably took the presence of the senior lien into account when it made its bid for the foreclosed property.
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Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com
Thanks for Four Years of Recognition from JD Supra’s Readers’ Choice Awards
May 20, 2019 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogA big thank you to the folks at JD Supra and its readers for recognizing us in its Construction category for its 2019 Readers’ Choice Awards! We’re honored to be among the 228 authors recognize for their visibility, engagement and thought leadership out of more than 50,000 who have published articles on JD Supra this past year.
Congratulations as well to the other JD Supra 2019 Readers’ Choice Award recipients whose hard work encourages us to be better authors.
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Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Connecticut Grapples With Failing Concrete Foundations
June 22, 2016 —
Nadine M. Post – Engineering News-RecordConnecticut’s commissioner of consumer protection, Jonathan A. Harris, expects to issue a report this fall on the “potential cause or causes” of failing concrete foundations in northeastern Connecticut. To date, the state Dept. of Consumer Protection has 225 complaints about foundation troubles from owners of single-family houses built between 1983 and 2003. But other building types also are affected, says William F. Neal, a professional engineer who, since 2010, has examined 300 buildings in 19 towns.
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Nadine M. Post, Engineering News-RecordMs. Post may be contacted at
postn@enr.com
Crossrail Audit Blames Busted Budget and Schedule on Mismanagement
August 13, 2019 —
Peter Reina - Engineering News-RecordIn a new report on London’s Crossrail, the U.K. National Audit Office says the beleaguered transportation project is around two years late and nearly 20% over budget because of poor management. The NAO, charged by Parliament with monitoring public spending, pointed to ill-conceived “aspirational” plans that proved to be unfit for the technologically challenging and vast program when things went wrong.
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Peter Reina, ENR
Insurer Must Indemnify Additional Insured After Settlement
October 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court determined that Target was an additional insured under its supplier's policy and the insurer had a duty to indemnify Target after it settled the underlying suit. Selective Ins. Co. v. Target Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123230 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2015).
Angela Brown sued Target when she was allegedly injured by a door to a fitting room that came unhinged and fell on her head. Harbor Industries, Inc. supplied Target with its fitting rooms. Pursuant to the "Supplier Qualification Agreement" (SQA), Harbor named Target as an additional insured under its policy with Selective Insurance Company. The SQA became effective and was to remain in effect until terminated by either party. A second agreement, the "Program Agreement," set forth the terms under which Harbor sold the fitting rooms to Target. The Program Agreement went into effect on April 23, 2009, and expired on July 1, 2010. Brown's injury occurred on December 17, 2011, while the SQA and the policy were in effect, but after the Program Agreement expired.
After Brown's injury, Target tendered to Selective, who denied coverage, contending Target was not an additional insured. The policy's endorsement expanded insureds to any additional insured whom Harbor agreed in a written contract to add as an additional insured. Selective filed suit and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
World Cup May Pull Out of Brazil because of Construction Delays
January 28, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFBack in October of last year, CNN reported that a judge suspended construction at one of the stadiums being built for this summer’s World Cup in Brazil. The judge stated that the dangers for construction workers included "being buried, run over, falling from heights and being hit by material, among other serious risks,” according to CNN.
Recently, the Los Angeles Times reported that FIFA is threatening to pull out of Brazil because of construction delays: “We cannot organize a match without a stadium,” Jerome Valcke, FIFA’s secretary general, as quoted in the Los Angeles Times. “This has reached a critical point.”
The deadline for completion of the 12 World Cup stadiums was January 1st, but various delays—including “fatal construction accidents at stadiums in Sao Paulo, Brasilia, and Manaus” as well as worker walk offs over pay—forced FIFA to “relax” the deadline.
Read the full story at CNN...
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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