California Supreme Court Shifts Gears on “Reverse CEQA”
February 23, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThe California Supreme Court has shifted gears on so-called “reverse CEQA” under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).
The Supreme Court, in a much-anticipated decision, in California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District, Case No. S213478 (December 17, 2015), held that public agencies subject to CEQA are not required to analyze whether existing environmental conditions may impact a proposed project’s future users or residents – also known as “reverse CEQA” or “CEQA in reverse” – as opposed to the more traditional analysis of a proposed project’s impact on the environment, unless:
1. The proposed project risks exacerbating existing environmental hazards – in which case, it is the proposed project’s impact on the environment not the environment’s impact on the proposed project, which compels the evaluation; or
2. A reverse CEQA analysis is already required under statute, for example, on certain airport, school and housing projects.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Consider Manner In Which Loan Agreement (Promissory Note) Is Drafted
March 02, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesConsider who you loan money too and, perhaps more importantly, the manner in which your loan agreements (promissory notes) are drafted. By way of example, in what appears to be a failed construction project in Conrad FLB Management, LLC v. Diamond Blue International, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2897a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), a group of lenders lent money to a limited liability company (“Company”) in connection with the development of a project. Promissory notes were executed by Company and executed by its managing member as a representative of Company, and not in a personal capacity. Company, however, did not own the project. Rather, an affiliated entity owned the project (“Affiliated Entity”). Affiliated Entity had the same managing member as Company. Once the Company received the loan proceeds, it transferred the money to Affiliated Entity, presumably for purposes of the project.
The loans were not repaid and the lenders sued Company, Affiliated Entity, and its managing member, in a personal capacity. The lenders claimed they were all jointly liable under the promissory notes. Although the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lenders, this was reversed on appeal as to the Affiliated Entity and the managing member because there was a factual issue as to whether they should be bound by the note executed on behalf of Company.
First, Florida Statute s. 673.4011(1) provides that “a person is not liable on a promissory note unless either (a) the person signed the note, or (b) the person is represented by an agent who signed the note.” Conrad FLB Management, LLC, supra. Affiliated Entity is a separate entity and did not execute the note.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Housing to Top Capital Spending in Next U.S. Growth Leg: Economy
September 24, 2014 —
Shobhana Chandra – BloombergBruce Hottle’s $10,000 computer systems upgrade in February at his Pennsylvania concrete plant may be his last investment for another two years.
More than 1,100 miles south in suburban Miami, Maggie Cruz-Ledon and her husband have set a 2015 deadline to buy a house, upping their budget in the process.
Hottle’s and Cruz-Ledon’s plans represent a sneak peek into the next leg of the expansion. Housing and business capital spending, two areas closely tied to swings in the world’s largest economy, are poised to diverge as home construction gives growth more of a boost in the long run while investment in new plants and equipment shows less promise, according to economists at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley.
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Shobhana Chandra, BloombergMs. Chandra may be contacted
schandra1@bloomberg.net
General Contractor’s Excess Insurer Denied Equitable Contribution From Subcontractor’s Excess Insurer
December 15, 2016 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Advent v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., etc. (No. H041934 filed 12/6/16), a California appeals court refused to order a subcontractor’s excess insurer to contribute to a general contractor’s excess insurer because the general contractor did not qualify as an additional insured of the subcontractor’s insurer, and the policy wording made the subcontractor’s excess insurer second level excess above the general contractor’s own excess insurance.
Advent was the general contractor on a housing development and Johnson was a sub-subcontractor providing concrete on perimeter walls. A Johnson employee dispatched to retrieve plywood dumped between some of the buildings somehow fell down an open stairwell inside one of the unfinished buildings and suffered serious injury. He sued Advent and others for negligence, but could not remember how he fell.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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How California’s Construction Industry has dealt with the New Indemnity Law
October 22, 2014 —
Mark S. Himmelstein, Esq. - Newmeyer & DillionIt has been almost two years since the California legislature enacted changes to the state’s indemnity law affecting commercial construction contracts. Although we do not yet have any court opinions analyzing the new statutes, the attorneys at
Newmeyer & Dillion now have real world experience in negotiating such indemnity provisions. It is time to evaluate how the construction community has reacted to the changes. In this article, we examine the practical applications of the new law to various construction agreements.
Enacted on January 1, 2013, the new legislation was the latest in a series of efforts by subcontractors and their insurers to eliminate “Type I” indemnity clauses. Under a Type I provision, a subcontractor has a duty to indemnify the developer or general contractor for the negligence of the developer or general contractor or other subcontractors, in addition to the negligence of the subcontractor itself. In 2006, the law was changed to preclude Type I provisions regarding “For Sale” residential construction defect claims. At that time, there was no such restriction enacted for commercial construction contracts. However, since then, commercial subcontractors have been seeking similar legislation. Their efforts culminated in the 2013 revisions regarding commercial contracts.
Commercial Subcontracts
Pursuant to the new indemnity statute — Civil Code section 2782.05 — we have revised our clients’ commercial subcontracts to:
(a) Eliminate the requirement that the subcontractor indemnify the general contractor for the general contractor’s “active negligence;” and
(b) Include the subcontractor’s options for defending claims for which they have an indemnity obligation.
Many subcontractors have responded: “Hey, wait a minute, the new legislation eliminated Type I indemnity so you (general contractor) cannot still require any indemnification for the general contractor’s negligence”. Well, that might be the rumor in subcontractor circles, but the new statute does not eliminate indemnity for the general contractor’s passive fault. In addition, the Civil Code lists 13 instances where the new indemnity restrictions do not apply.
Residential Subcontracts
The legislature did not make anyone’s job easier by drafting a different indemnity provision for commercial subcontracts than for residential subcontracts. In fact, the residential and commercial statutes are different in several critical respects. First, the restrictions on indemnity in the residential statute apply only to construction defect claims in newly constructed “For Sale” houses. The statute does not preclude Type I indemnity provisions for any other claims arising out of residential subcontracts. In contrast, the indemnity restrictions in the commercial statute apply to all claims arising out of commercial subcontracts. In addition, the commercial statute allows indemnity for the general contractor’s passive fault. Since some subcontractors on “residential” projects perform off-site “commercial” work as well, we have amended even residential subcontracts to address the subcontractors’ various indemnity obligations for different parts of their work (e.g., residential work versus commercial work).
Owner-Contractor Agreements
The January 1, 2013 new indemnity provisions apply not only to subcontracts, but also to owner-contractor agreements. Civil Code section 2782(c)(1) precludes indemnity for an owner’s active negligence. Interestingly, the exclusions contained in Civil Code section 2782.05 for subcontracts do not apply, and the statute does not provide contractors with the option of defending claims set forth in the sections concerning subcontracts. Therefore, we have revised the indemnity provisions in owner-contractor agreements to exclude indemnity for the owner’s active negligence.
Design Professional Agreements
The 2007 revisions with respect to “For Sale” residential contracts (discussed above), and the 2013 revisions for commercial contracts do not apply to design professionals. The new indemnity statute concerning commercial subcontracts specifically excludes design professionals from the “anti-indemnity” benefits provided to subcontractors. Therefore, Type I indemnity provisions are fair game and can still be included in design professional contracts.
Conclusion
In sum, Civil Code sections 2782 et seq. now contain an increasingly complex framework for indemnity rules in construction contracts. For example, there is one set of rules for “For Sale” residential construction defect claims (no indemnity for the developer’s active or passive negligence), another for any other claims arising out of residential construction (Type I indemnity is permitted), another for commercial subcontracts (no indemnity for the general contractor’s active negligence, but indemnity for the general contractor’s passive negligence unless any of the exceptions apply, in which case Type I indemnity is permitted), and yet another for commercial owner contractor agreements (no indemnity for the owner’s active negligence, but indemnity for the owner’s passive negligence with no exceptions).
California’s indemnity laws are complex, and rumors as to the impact of the new legislation have made it even more difficult to negotiate these provisions. It is imperative that indemnity clauses in construction contracts clearly delineate the obligations for the specific type or types of work contemplated by the contract. The legislature’s attempt to simplify indemnity obligations has actually made such provisions lengthier and more cumbersome. As experienced construction attorneys, our task is to draft indemnity provisions that comply with the laws, address potential claims, and are understandable.
Mr. Himmelstein is a partner in the Newport Beach office of Newmeyer & Dillion and practices in the areas of construction, real estate, business and insurance litigation. He also specializes in drafting and negotiating construction and real estate contracts. Mark can be reached at mark.himmelstein@ndlf.com.
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Sometimes it Depends on “Whose” Hand is in the Cookie Jar
January 21, 2015 —
Roger Hughes – California Construction Law BlogIn a lengthy and somewhat detailed decision, the California Court of Appeal for First District, in Pittsburg Unified School District v. S.J. Amoroso Construction Company, Inc., Case No. A138825 (December 22, 2014), held that a public entity could unilaterally withdraw retention funds during a pending legal dispute without the court first finding that the contractor had defaulted on the public works project.
Background
In 2008, general contractor S.J. Amoroso Construction Company, Inc. (“S.J. Amoroso”) entered into a construction contract with the Pittsburg Unified School District (“District”) for the reconstruction and modernization of a high school in Pittsburg, California.
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Roger Hughes, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Hughes may be contacted at
rhughes@wendel.com
Despite Misapplying California Law, Federal Court Acknowledges Virus May Cause Physical Alteration to Property
October 26, 2020 —
Scott P. DeVries, Michael S. Levine & Michael L. Huggins - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOn August 28, Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the Central District of California, entered the latest ruling in the ongoing saga of the COVID-19 business interruption coverage dispute between celebrity plaintiff’s attorney Mark Geragos and Insurer Travelers.
The case, 10E, LLC v. The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut, was filed in state court. Travelers removed to federal court, where Geragos sought remand and Travelers moved to dismiss. Judge Wilson denied remand and granted the Motion to Dismiss, finding plaintiff did not satisfactorily allege the actual presence of COVID-19 on insured property or physical damage to its property. This holding is inconsistent with long standing principles of California insurance law and appears to improperly enhance the minimal pleading threshold under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only allege a claim “that is plausible on its face.”).
After rejecting Geragos’ attempt to have the case remanded based on a finding that Geragos had fraudulently joined a defendant to avoid removal, the Judge proceeded to the Motion to Dismiss which raised three issues: (1) the effect of the Virus Exclusion in the Travelers’ Policy, (2) whether plaintiff failed to allege that the governmental orders prohibited access to its property, and (3) whether plaintiff could “‘plausibly allege that it suffered ‘direct physical loss or damage to property’ as required for civil authority coverage.’” Rather than address the effect of the exclusion, which would be the narrowest issue (this exclusion is not present in all policies), the Court proceeded directly to the third issue, which has the broadest potential application.
Reprinted courtesy of
Scott P. DeVries, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael L. Huggins, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. DeVries may be contacted at sdevries@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Huggins may be contacted at mhuggins@HuntonAK.com
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Unqualified Threat to Picket a Neutral is Unfair Labor Practice
January 08, 2019 —
Wally Zimolong - Supplemental ConditionsOn December 27, 2018, the National Labor Relations Board enforced a decades old policy that a union’s unqualified threat to picket a neutral employer at a “common situs” a/k/a a construction site is a violation of the National Labor Relations Act.
Background
The case involved area standards picketing by the IBEW of a project owned by the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (LVCVA). The IBEW sent a letter to various affiliated unions who were working on the project advising them of its intent to engage in area standards picketing at the project directed to the merit shop electrical subcontractor performing work there. The IBEW also sent a copy of the letter to the LVCVA.
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
