WSDOT Excludes Non-Minority Women-Owned DBEs from Participation Goals
June 15, 2017 —
Ellie Perka - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCA drastic change has been implemented by the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) to the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) Program in Washington. Effective June 1, 2017, WSDOT has implemented a “waiver” to exclude women-owned DBEs[i] from qualifying toward Condition of Award (“COA”) Goals on federally-funded projects. This move is significant. It will likely result in long-lasting detrimental impacts on the DBE community, women-owned businesses, and the entire construction community in Washington. The construction industry should be in an uproar over this change. Instead, it has largely gone unnoticed (likely because its impacts have not yet been felt). It is a de facto exclusion of women-owned businesses from the DBE program, and the severity of this change cannot be overstated.
Under the waiver, women-owned businesses no longer satisfy COA Goals on federally-funded projects (i.e., projects receiving funding from the Federal Highway Administration) advertised after June 1, 2017. Existing contracts are not impacted and may continue to utilize women-owned DBEs to satisfy COA Goals until the project is complete. The waiver is not retroactive.
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Ellie Perka, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMs. Perka may be contacted at
eperka@ac-lawyers.com
David McLain Recognized Among the 2021 Edition of The Best Lawyers in America© for Construction Law
October 19, 2020 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationDavid McLain is a founding member of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell. Mr. McLain has over 22 years of experience and is well known for his work in the defense of the construction industry, particularly in the area of construction defect litigation. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the CLM Claims College - School of Construction, which is the premier course for insurance, industry, and legal professionals. Law Week Colorado recently named Mr. McLain as the 2019 People’s Choice for Best Construction Defects Lawyer for Defendants.
HHMR is highly regarded for its expertise in construction law and the litigation of construction-related claims, including the defense of large and complex construction defect matters. Our attorneys provide exceptional service to individuals, business owners, Fortune 500 companies, and the insurance industry. The firm is experienced in providing legal support throughout trials and alternative dispute resolution such as mediations and arbitrations.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & RoswellMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
How to Challenge a Project Labor Agreement
May 24, 2018 —
Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions Building and Construction Trades Council of Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts Rhode Island, Inc Massachusetts Water Resources Authority v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts Rhode Island, Inc, 507 U.S. 218, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993) , affectionately knows as Boston Harbor, is the seminal Supreme Court decision that held that the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) does not preempt government mandated project labor agreements (“PLAs”) if the government entity is acting as a market participant rather than a market regulator. Boston Harbor has led to many believing that virtually all PLAs are legal when the government agency is a project owner or if the PLA involves a private project. However, does Boston Harbor really cut that far?
In short, no. The primary issue in Boston Harbor was one of preemption. The Supreme Court addressed whether the NLRA preempted state and local laws and ordinances mandating PLAs. On that narrow issue, the Supreme Court said there is no preemption if the government is acting as a market participant. What the Court did not address is whether other federal statutes invalidate PLAs. Specifically, whether PLA’s can run afoul of Section 8(e), the so called “hot cargo” provisions, of the NLRA.
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
California Supreme Court to Examine Arbitration Provisions in Several Upcoming Cases
December 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFGlen C. Hansen, writing on Abbott & Kinderman’s Land Use Law Blog looks at several cases pending before the California Supreme Court which ask if a developer can insist on arbitration of construction defect claims, based on provision in the CC&Rs. Currently, there is a split of opinions in the California appeals courts on the issue.
Four of the cases are in California’s Fourth Appellate District. In the earliest case, Villa Milano Homeowners Association v. Il Davorge, from 2000, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was sufficient to require that construction defect claims undergo arbitration. However, the Fourth Appellate District Court concluded in three later cases that the arbitration clauses did not allow the developer to compel arbitration. In two cases, argued in 2008 and 2010, the court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the homeowners of their right to a jury trial. In the most recent case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Nobel Court Development, the court decided that the CC&Rs did not create contractual rights for the developer.
The Second Appellate District Court came to a similar decision in Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Association v. Western Pacific Housing, Inc. In their decision, the court noted that CC&Rs could be enforced by homeowners and homeowners associations, but not developers.
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Congratulations to Haight Attorneys Selected to the 2023 Southern California Super Lawyers List
January 17, 2023 —
Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPHaight attorneys have been selected to the 2023 Southern California Super Lawyers list.
Congratulations to:
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Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Significant Victory for the Building Industry: Liberty Mutual is Rejected Once Again, This Time by the Third Appellate District in Holding SB800 is the Exclusive Remedy
December 15, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman & Ravi R. Mehta – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin I. Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Certified for Publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District recently elaborated on the scope of the Right to Repair Act, commonly known as SB-800 (“Act”). In
Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Kevin Hicks, et al.) (certified for publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), the Court considered whether the Act (and specifically the Act’s pre-litigation procedure) applies, when homeowners plead construction defect claims based only on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Act (
Civil Code §896). The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The homeowners of seventeen (17) single-family homes filed a Complaint against the builder of their homes, Elliott Homes, Inc. (“Elliott”), alleging common law causes of action for construction defects. Elliott filed a motion to stay the litigation on the ground that the homeowners failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the homeowners that this pre-litigation procedure did not apply because the homeowners had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. Elliott appealed. The Court of Appeal purely considered the question of whether the Act, including its pre-litigation procedure, applies when a homeowner pleads construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, and not on statutory violations of the Act’s building standards.
To answer this question, the Court analyzed a recent case decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. In this subrogation case, a builder’s insurer asserted common law causes of action (but not statutory building standard violations) alleging construction defects against the builder to recover amounts paid to the homeowner after a sprinkler system failure caused extensive damage to the subject property. The trial court sustained the builder’s demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it was time-barred under the Act. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order, holding that common law construction defect claims arising from actual damages are not covered by the Act because “the Act does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases where actual damage has occurred.” (
Liberty Mutual, 219 Cal.App.4th 98, 109).
The
Elliott Court declined to follow
Liberty Mutual, finding that that Court failed to properly analyze the language of the Act. The
Elliott Court analyzed both the statutory scheme and the legislative history of the Act to arrive at the conclusion that common law causes of action for construction defects do indeed fall within the purview of the Act.
According to the
Elliott Court, the Act “broadly applies to
any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in…residential construction and in such an action, a homeowner’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of the standards set forth in the Act, except as specified.” Further, the Act expressly provides that “no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed.”
Civil Code §943(a). In turn,
Civil Code §944 allows for a recovery for the cost of repairing a building standard violation, or for the cost of repairing any damage caused by such a violation, among other things.
The limited exceptions to the Act’s applicability concern the enforcement of a contract, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. Civil Code §943(a). Additionally, the Act does not apply to condominium conversions. Civil Code §896.
The Elliott Court explains that apart from these exceptions, the Legislature intended the Act to apply to all construction defect claims (regardless of damage) relating to the construction of residential properties whose sales contracts are signed after January 1, 2003. There is no exception in the Act, express or implied, for common law causes of action.
Next, the Court turns to the Act’s legislative history to buttress this conclusion. This history makes clear that the Act is a legislative response to the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, that construction defects in residential properties are only actionable in tort when actual property damage manifests. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings indicate that the Act was the product of protracted negotiations between varying interested parties, including construction industry trade groups and consumer protection groups. The Legislature intended (1) to promulgate building standards, violations of which would be actionable, even without damage, and (2) to allow homeowners to recover for actual damage caused by construction defects not covered by the building standards. In other words, the Act was intended to provide homeowners redress regardless of whether damage had manifested.
Therefore, the Court concluded that common law causes of action for construction defects, regardless of damage, are subject to the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its earlier order, and to enter a new order granting Elliott’s motion to stay the litigation until the homeowners (and Elliott) have satisfied the pre-litigation procedure of the Act.
II. McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132
Similar to the Third Appellate District Court’s ruling in
Elliott, the Fifth Appellate District Court also rejected the holding of
Liberty Mutual in a matter now pending before the California Supreme Court:
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132 (review granted and opinion superseded sub nom.
Albany v. Superior Court 360 P.3d 1022). Also similar to
Elliott, in
McMillin a group of homeowners filed common law construction defect claims against the builder of their homes. The builder,
McMillin, moved to stay the litigation pending compliance with the Act’s pre-litigation procedure. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act does not apply because the homeowners have not asserted statutory building standard violations contained within the Act.
In reasoning substantially similar to that of
Elliott, the
McMillin Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s holding that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for pursuing construction defect claims, with or without damage. Thus, the
McMillin Court issued a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s earlier order and to enter a new order granting McMillin’s motion to stay.
On November 24, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the homeowners’ petition for review. In August of 2016, briefing was completed and the matter is now awaiting the scheduling of arguments. CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the pending appeal of this matter to the California Supreme Court, as well as all related developments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Ravi R. Mehta, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Mehta may be contacted at rmehta@cgdrblaw.com
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Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
July 30, 2019 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistArkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
Reconciling Prompt Payments and Withholding of Retention Payments
March 30, 2016 —
Eric J. Rollins, Esq. – Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPIt is common in California for the owners of a project to make monthly payments to a contractor for work as it is completed, but withhold a certain percentage as a guarantee of future satisfactory performance. Contractors almost always pass these withholdings on to their subcontractors. Unsurprisingly, disputes can arise regarding when the withheld retentions must be paid.
Civil Code section 8814, subdivision (a), states that a direct contractor must pay each subcontractor its share of a retention payment within ten days after receiving all or part of a retention payment. However, an exception exists -- a direct contractor may withhold from the retention paid to a subcontractor an amount not in excess of 150 percent of the estimated value of the disputed amount, whenever a “good faith dispute exists between the direct contractor and a subcontractor.” (See Cal. Civ. Code, § 8814, subd. (c).) The problem with the statute is that it offers no help in defining a “good faith dispute,” and the California courts have historically not provided much guidance either. Can a “good faith dispute” be any dispute between the contracting parties, e.g., a dispute regarding change orders, mismanagement, etc.? Or must the dispute relate specifically to the retention? Unfortunately for California litigants, the answer may depend on the appellate district in which the parties find themselves.
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Eric J. Rollins, Esq., Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPMr. Rollins may be contacted at
eric.rollins@ndlf.com
