Rams Owner Stan Kroenke Debuts His $5.5 Billion Dream Stadium
September 14, 2020 —
Christopher Palmeri - BloombergThe first thing you notice that’s different about SoFi Stadium is that you can walk from the parking lot almost directly into the fifth level of the arena.
There’s no passing through gate after gate or ascending endless circular walkways. Construction workers dug up over 7 million cubic yards of dirt to build an arena that sits 100 feet (30 meters) below grade.
It’s one of the many features that make SoFi, the National Football League’s biggest stadium, surprisingly visitor-friendly. Not that fans will be able to experience it just yet. When the stadium debuts Sunday with the first game of the Los Angeles Rams’ season, it will be spectator-free -- the result of pandemic-spurred restrictions on gatherings. But it will still be a spectacle.
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Christopher Palmeri, Bloomberg
Arizona Supreme Court Confirms a Prevailing Homeowner Can Recover Fees on Implied Warranty Claims
August 30, 2017 —
Rick Erickson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogOn August 9th, in Sirrah Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Wunderlich, the Arizona Supreme Court settled the question about recovery of attorneys’ fees after prevailing on implied warranty claims against a residential contractor. The simple answer is, yes, a homeowner who prevails on the merits can recover the fees they spent to prove that shoddy construction breached the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. Why? Because, as Justice Timmer articulated, “[t]he implied warranty is a contract term.” Although implied, the warranty is legally part of the written agreement in which “a residential builder warrants that its work is performed in a workmanlike manner and that the structure is habitable.”
In other words, a claim based on the implied warranty not only arises out of the contract, the claim is actually based on a contract term. Since, in A.R.S. § 12-341.01, Arizona law provides for prevailing parties to recover their fees on claims “arising out of contract” and because the implied warranty is now viewed by the courts as a contract term, homeowners can recover their fees after successfully proving breach of the implied warranty.
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Rick Erickson, Snell & WilmerMr Erickson may be contacted at
rerickson@swlaw.com
Explore Legal Immigration Options for Construction Companies
August 29, 2022 —
Megan R. Naughton - Construction ExecutiveAlthough the visa options are limited, there are some that can be explored by construction companies in the United States, including the following.
H-1B
The H-1B visa category may be available for construction positions that require at least a bachelor’s degree in a specific field such as civil engineering, construction management or accounting. The timing can be challenging if an employer is looking to hire a recent graduate or someone outside of the United States for a role because of the H-1B lottery but can work well if the candidate is already in H-1B status and working for another company. These visas are site-specific, so they may need amending if a worker is moved from one site to another.
H-2B
The H-2B visa category is an option if the construction work is seasonal in nature and recurs each year, and if the company can plan its specific needs sufficiently far in advance. Timing is difficult with these; they require proving a shortage of U.S. workers and are subject to a lottery system like the H-1B.
Reprinted courtesy of
Megan R. Naughton, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Giant Gas Pipeline Owner, Contractor in $900M Payment Battle
January 22, 2024 —
David Godkin, Debra K. RubinA Canadian partnership including energy developer TC Energy that is building the $10.6-billion Coastal GasLink pipeline, and a key project contractor, are disputing more than $900 million in project costs in court and in upcoming arbitration. The 670-kilometer line in British Columbia that announced mechanical completion last year is set to carry liquefied natural gas to the LNG Canada export terminal under construction on the province’s Pacific Coast—the country’s first such facility.
Reprinted courtesy of
David Godkin, Engineering News-Record and
Debra K. Rubin, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Rubin may be contacted at rubind@enr.com
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Fracking Fears Grow as Oklahoma Hit by More Earthquakes Than California
July 09, 2014 —
Zain Shauk – BloombergSquinting into a laptop perched on the back of his pickup, Austin Holland searches for a signal from a coffee-can-sized sensor buried under the grassy prairie.
Holland, Oklahoma’s seismology chief, is determined to find the cause of an unprecedented earthquake epidemic in the state. And he suspects pumping wastewater from oil and gas drilling back into the Earth has a lot to do with it.
“If my research takes me to the point where we determine the safest thing to do is to shut down injection -- and consequently production -- in large portions of the state, then that’s what we have to do,” Holland said. “That’s for the politicians and the regulators to work out.”
So far this year, Oklahoma has had more than twice the number of earthquakes as California, making it the most seismically active state in the continental U.S. As recently as 2003, Oklahoma was ranked 17th for earthquakes. That shift has given rise to concern among communities and environmentalists that injecting vast amounts of wastewater back into the ground is contributing to the rise in Oklahoma’s quakes. The state pumps about 350,000 barrels of oil a day, making it the fifth largest producer in the U.S.
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Zain Shauk, BloombergMr. Shauk may be contacted at
zshauk@bloomberg.net
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Mediation in the Zero Sum World of Construction
September 26, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsConstruction is a zero sum game. What do I mean by that? I mean that even where you, a construction professional with a great construction lawyer, have reviewed and edited a subcontract presented to you or provided a well-drafted contract to the other party that contains an attorney fees provision, every dollar that you spend on litigation is a dollar less of profit.
Couple the fact that no construction company can or should bid or negotiate work with an eye toward litigation (aside from having a well written contract that will be enforced to the letter here in Virginia). Particularly on “low bid” type projects, contractors and subcontractors cannot “pad” their bids to take into account the possibility of attorney fees, arbitration, or litigation. Furthermore, the loss of productivity when your “back office” personnel are tied up dealing with discovery, phone calls, and other incidents of litigation that do nothing but rehash a bad project and increase the expense sap money from the bottom line. While the possibility of a judgment including attorney fees may soften this blow, you are still out the cash.
All of this said, if you are in commercial construction for any significant period of time disputes will arise and I have discussed the process in some detail at other places here at Construction Law Musings. As a construction litigator, I am fully aware of this fact of life. Efficient management of these disputes is key, particularly when they escalate to the point where some form of outside “help” (read arbitrator or judge) is necessary.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Potential Pitfalls Under the Contract Disputes Act for Federal Government Contractors
February 28, 2018 —
Sarah K. Carpenter – Smith Currie PublicationsThe Contract Disputes Act (CDA) governs monetary and non-monetary disputes arising out of contracts or implied-in-fact contracts between the federal government and contractors. Because the CDA is an exclusive remedy, it is important that contractors be wary of the many pitfalls that may be encountered by a contractor seeking to assert a claim against the government under the CDA.
The pitfalls faced by a contractor under the CDA can arise before a contractor becomes aware of a potential claim. Pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 43.204(c), a contracting officer should include in any supplemental agreement, including any change order, a Contractor’s Statement of Release which requires a contractor to execute a broad release of the government from any and all liability under the contract. As a result of this FAR provision, in executing a routine change order, a contractor may inadvertently release its right to pursue a potential claim under the CDA. A contractor should always review any release language prior to executing a supplemental agreement or change order with the government.
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Sarah K. Carpenter, Smith CurrieMs. Carpenter may be contacted at
skcarpenter@smithcurrie.com
