Private Project Payment Bonds and Pay if Paid in Virginia
January 05, 2017 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsOne of the many items of construction law that has always been about as clear as mud has been the interaction between a contractual pay if paid clause and payment bond claims either under the Federal Miller Act or Virginia’s “Little Miller Act.” While properly drafted contractual “pay if paid” clauses are enforceable by their terms in Virginia, what has always been less clear is whether a bonding company can take advantage of such a clause when defending a payment bond claim. As always, these questions are very fact specific both under the Federal Act and the state statute. I wish that this post would answer this question, but alas, it will not.
A recent case from the City of Roanoke, Virginia looked at the interaction between a payment bond and a “condition precedent” pay if paid clause as it relates to a private project that is not subject to the Little Miller Act. In the case of IES Commercial, Inc v The Hanover Insurance Company, the Court examined a contractual clause between Thor Construction and IES Commercial in tandem with the bond language between Hanover Insurance Company and Thor as it related to a surprisingly familiar scenario. The general facts are these: IES performed, Thor demanded payment from the owner for the work that IES performed and the owner, for reasons that are left unstated in the opinion, refused to pay. IES sues Hanover pursuant to the payment bond and Hanover moves to dismiss the suit because Thor hadn’t been paid by the owner and therefore Hanover could take advantage of the pay if paid language.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
California Ballot Initiative Seeks to Repeal Infrastructure Funding Bill
September 25, 2018 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogCalifornia voters will get to vote on November 6, 2018 on a ballot initiative to repeal an infrastructure funding bill signed by Governor Brown this past year that is estimated to raise more than $5 billion annually during the next ten years for road repairs and mass transit improvements in California.
In 2017, Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 1, the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017, which increased the excise tax on gasoline in the state by 12 cents per gallon, to 30 cents per gallon, and increasing vehicle registration fees from $25 to $175 dollars depending on the value of the vehicle. The last time the state’s gas tax was increased was in 1994 and the last time the federal gas tax was increased was in 1993.
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Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 —
Shaun McParland BaldwinThe Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
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Traub Lieberman Partner Bradley T. Guldalian Wins Summary Judgment
November 19, 2021 —
Bradley T. Guldalian - Traub LiebermanOn September 14, 2021, Traub Lieberman Partner Bradley T. Guldalian secured summary judgment on behalf of a City which operated a park containing a natural bathing spring in Sarasota County, Florida. The underlying loss occurred when the Plaintiff went to the park, entered the spring without incident, swam for more than an hour, then exited the spring and was returning to the area where she had stored her belongings when she slipped and fell on mud and grass, sustaining an open angulated fracture of her right tibia and fibula. The Plaintiff was rushed to the hospital where she underwent open reduction, internal fixation surgery on her right leg which consisted of implantation of a metal rod into the medullary cavity of her tibia that was secured by two proximal and two distal interlocking screws. She was in the hospital for four days. Upon discharge, the Plaintiff was placed in a walking boot and confined to a wheelchair for several months. The Plaintiff incurred nearly $100,000 in medical expenses. The Plaintiff filed a premises liability action against the City claiming it failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. The Plaintiff also alleged that the City failed to warn her that the area where she had stored her belongings had become saturated and slippery proximately causing her fall and resulting injuries.
After the close of discovery, Mr. Guldalian filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the City arguing the wet grass and mud upon which the Plaintiff fell and injured herself was a byproduct of patrons going in and out of the water and walking to and from the area where they stored their belongings, was open and obvious, and did not constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law. Citing to case law from the Florida Supreme Court which held that it is common knowledge that walks adjacent to, leading to, or surrounding a bathing area generally have water constantly thrown upon them and are in a slippery condition, as well as deposition testimony from the Plaintiff confirming she had been swimming at the spring for the past eighteen plus years and was “very familiar” with the park, the spring, and the area where she normally stored her belongings, Mr. Guldalian argued that some injury-causing conditions, like wet grass and mud surrounding a swimming area, are simply so open and so obvious that they cannot be held, as a matter of law, to give rise to liability as dangerous conditions.
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Bradley T. Guldalian, Traub LiebermanMr. Guldalian may be contacted at
bguldalian@tlsslaw.com
Virginia Joins California and Nevada in Passing its Consumer Privacy Act
March 15, 2021 —
Kyle Janecek – Newmeyer DillionCalifornia tends to be on the forefront in consumer privacy laws within the United States. However, there is a growing momentum for other states to join California in legislating consumer privacy rights, as well as pushes for federal legislation. The latest state to join in and pass consumer privacy legislation is Virginia, with its Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). With Virginia joining the fray, several questions arise, such as how closely does the VCDPA follow California's legislation? How, if at all, does it differ from already-existing legislation? What do businesses need to comply with the VCDPA, if at all?
WHAT IS THE VIRGINIA CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The VCDPA largely mimics elements from its Californian cousins, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) as modified by the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA). The main features of the law include: (a) issuing the right to request what information is collected; (b) the right to correct information provided; (c) the right to deletion; (d) providing notice to consumers regarding the collection of their data; and (e) protecting consumer data. Further, the consumer requests, akin to the CCPA, do require verification, and similarly phrased data security practices that rely on how "reasonable" they are, depending on the volume and type of information at issue. Though, the VCDPA does expand on this slightly, requiring "data protection assessments" to determine the security of protected information, how it is shared and used, the benefits in sharing the information and harm resulting from any breaches.
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Kyle Janecek, Newmeyer DillionMr. Janecek may be contacted at
kyle.janecek@ndlf.com
Florida Appellate Court Holds Four-Year Statute of Limitations Applicable Irrespective of Contractor Licensure
June 22, 2016 —
Clay Whittaker – Florida Construction Law UpdateIn Brock v. Garner Window & Door Sales, Inc.,[1] Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected a novel attempt to circumvent Florida’s well-established four-year statute of limitations for all actions founded on the construction of an improvement to real property. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract as a result of water intrusion damage following the installation of windows.[2] It was undisputed that Plaintiff commenced the litigation more than four years following the discovery of the allegedly latent defect in the window installation.[3] Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the window contractor could not rely on the four-year statute of limitations because the window subcontractor was not a licensed contractor and, therefore, the five-year statute of limitations for actions founded on written contracts should apply.
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Clay Whittaker, Cole, Scott, & Kissane, P.A.Mr. Whittaker may be contacted at
clay.whittaker@csklegal.com
Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Maximizing Contractual Indemnity Rights: Components of an Effective Provision
December 02, 2015 —
William Kennedy – White and Williams LLPTort law is aimed at providing compensation to the victims of negligence. Tort law encourages plaintiffs to cast a wide net, pursuing claims or suits against not only those whose fault seems manifestly primary, but also against defendants whose causal exposure is minimal, against those whose exposure is purely by operation of law. As discussed in the first installment of this series, "Maximizing Contractual Indemnity: Problems with Common Law," three common law principles – vicarious liability, joint and several liability, and common law indemnity – cause some parties to pay in excess of their actual degree of causal fault. Contractual indemnity can remedy that harsh result.
Part Two: Components of an Effective Provision
Properly composed, “broad form” contractual indemnity provisions permit an Indemnitee to shift the full range of financial consequences from tort exposure, including civil damages, defense fees, expert fees, and litigation expenses. Such contracts permit indemnity even where the underlying damage was incurred due to a degree of negligence or fault on the part of the Indemnitee. Such contracts can also allow an Indemnitee to shift to the Indemnitor the risk of loss for someone from whom the Indemnitor would otherwise be immune from suit (e.g., the Indemnitor’s employees). A well-written contract can even convert an entity which is an Indemnitor as to one party (e.g., a general contractor which has to indemnify a property owner) into an Indemnitee as to another party (e.g., a subcontractor) for the very same risk.
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William Kennedy, White and Williams LLPMr. Kennedy may be contacted at
kennedyw@whiteandwilliams.com
