Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP is Proud to Announce Jeannette Garcia Has Been Elected as Secretary of the Hispanic Bar Association of Orange County!
February 03, 2020 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPThe Hispanic Bar Association of Orange County is an affiliate bar of the OCBA. The OC HBA promotes education, unity, and excellence in the Hispanic legal community by expanding the business and professional opportunities available to its members, enhancing the members’ business and professional stature in the Hispanic community, increasing the participation of Hispanic leaders in civic affairs and enhancing the quality of life for the members and the community.
Associate Jeannette Garcia has been a member of the OC HBA since 2012, a board member since 2017 and an executive board member since 2018. Jeannette will now serve as Secretary of the OC HBA for the 2020 term.
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Real Property Alert: Recording Notice of Default as Trustee Before Being Formally Made the Trustee Does Not Make Foreclosure Sale Void
February 18, 2015 —
Krsto Mijanovic and Annette F. Mijanovic – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Ram, et al. v. OneWest Bank, FSB, et al. (filed 2/6/15, No. A139055), the California Court of Appeal held that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not void merely because the notice of default was recorded by an entity who had not yet been substituted as trustee. The court also held that because the sale was voidable, rather than void, the plaintiffs were required to allege an ability and willingness to tender their debt in addition to alleging that they were prejudiced by the irregularity in the foreclosure process.
Plaintiffs were borrowers who purchased a home subject to a deed of trust. After they defaulted on their loan, nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, OneWest Bank, FSB ("OneWest"), purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued OneWest and other entities for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the sale was void because the entity identified as the trustee on the notice of default, Aztec Foreclosure Corporation ("Aztec"), had not been formally substituted as trustee until after the notice of default was recorded. The trial court sustained OneWest's demurrer and plaintiff appealed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Krsto Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Annette F. Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Mijanovic may be contacted at kmijanovic@hbblaw.com
Ms. Mijanovic may be contacted at amijanovic@hbblaw.com
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South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship
May 26, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii On May 17, 2011, South Carolina passed legislation to combat the restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policies. S.C. Code Ann. sec. 38-61-70.
The legislation reversed a decision by the state's Supreme Court issued earlier this year. See Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 W.L. 93716 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011). Crossman had overruled an earlier decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that holding that defective construction was an “occurrence.” Crossman, however, reversed course, holding that damages resulting from faulty workmanship were the “natural and probable cause” of the faulty work and, as such, did not qualify as an “occurrence.”
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Montrose III: Vertical Exhaustion Applies in Upper Layers of Excess Coverage
May 18, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Montrose Chemical Corp. of Cal. v. Superior Court (No. S244737, filed 4/6/20) (Montrose III), the California Supreme Court held that, as between excess insurers at differing levels of coverage, a rule of “vertical exhaustion” or “elective stacking” applies, whereby the insured may access any excess policy once it has exhausted other excess policies with lower attachment points in the same policy period. The Court limited the rule to excess insurance, stating that “[b]ecause the question is not presented here, we do not decide when or whether an insured may access excess policies before all primary insurance covering all relevant policy periods has been exhausted.”
Montrose manufactured the insecticide DDT in Torrance from 1947 to 1982. In 1990, the state and federal governments sued Montrose for environmental contamination and Montrose entered into partial consent decrees agreeing to pay for cleanup. Montrose claimed to have expended in excess of $100 million doing so, and asserted that its future liability could exceed that amount.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Arizona Is the No. 1 Merit Shop Construction State, According to ABC’s 2020 Scorecard
February 15, 2021 —
ABC - Construction ExecutiveAssociated Builders and Contractors released its
2020 Merit Shop Scorecard, an annual ranking based on state policies and programs that encourage workforce development, strengthen career and technical education, grow careers in construction, and promote fair and open competition for taxpayer-funded construction projects.
Arizona topped the rankings for the first time this year based on the state’s promotion of free enterprise and investment in tomorrow’s construction workforce, a top priority for ABC. Georgia followed Arizona in second place this year, up from fifth in 2019. Florida, a year-to-year high performer, remained in the top five after two years in the top rank in 2018 and 2019.
“A foundational pillar of ABC is building the next generation of craft professionals, and the top states in this year’s rankings lead the country in workforce development policies,” said Ben Brubeck, ABC’s vice president of regulatory, labor and state affairs. “The merit shop contractor can flourish in free enterprise environments created in states like Arizona and Florida, which has positive ripple effects on a state’s overall economic growth.”
Reprinted courtesy of
ABC, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Know When Your Claim “Accrues” or Risk Losing It
August 20, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI have discussed statutes of limitation on construction claims in various contexts from issues with a disconnect on state projects to questions of continuous breach here at Construction Law Musings. For those that are first time readers, the statute of limitations is the time during which a plaintiff can bring its claim, whether under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), for breach of contract, or for any other legal wrong that was done to him, her or it by another. The range of limitations runs the gamut of times, for instance it is 5 years for breach of a written contract and 6 months for enforcement of a mechanic’s lien. This time period is calculated from the “accrual” of the right of action. “Accrual” is, in general terms, when the plaintiff was originally harmed or should have known it was harmed (depending on the particular cause of action).
A recent case out of the Circuit Court of Norfolk, Virginia examined when a cause of action for a construction related claim under the VCPA accrued and thus whether the plaintiff’s claim was timely. In Hyde Park Free Will Baptist Church v. Skye-Brynn Enterprises Inc., the Court looked at the following basic facts (pay attention to the dates):
The Plaintiff, Hyde Park Baptist Church, hired the Defendant, Skye-Brynn Enterprises, Inc., to perform certain roof repairs that were “completed” in 2015. Shortly after the work was done, in 2015, the Plaintiff informed Defendant that the roof still leaked and that some leaks were worse than before. The Defendant unsuccessfully attempted repair at the time. 14 months later in 2017, the church had other contractors examine the roof and opine as to its faulty installation. Also in 2017, the church submitted roof samples to GAF, the roof membrane manufacturer and in February 2018 GAF responded stating that the leaks were not due to manufacturing defects. The church filed its complaint on October 1, 2018 breach of contract, breach of warranty of workmanship and fraud in violation of the VCPA. Defendant responded with a plea in bar, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claim.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Is the Event You Are Claiming as Unforeseeable Delay Really Unforeseeable?
September 26, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIs the item or event you are claiming as an unforeseeable, excusable delay really unforeseeable? This is not a trick question.
Just because your construction contract identifies items or events that constitute unforeseeable, excusable delay does not mean those items can be used as a blanket excuse or crutch for the contractor. That would be unfair.
For instance, it is not uncommon for a construction contract to list as unforeseeable, excusable delay the following events or items: “(i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) act of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers.” See, e.g., F.A.R. 52.249-10(b)(1). While the itemization of excusable delay may be worded differently, the point is there may be a listing as to what items or events constitute excusable delay. An excusable delay would justify additional time and, potentially, compensation to the contractor.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
California Appellate Court Holds “Minimal Causal Connection” Satisfies Causation Requirement in All Risk Policies
July 20, 2020 —
Scott P. DeVries & Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews KurthOn May 26, 2020, a California Court of Appeals (4th District) issued its decision in Mosley et al. v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co. The case arose in the context of a marijuana-growing tenant who rerouted a home’s electrical system and caused an electrical fire. The issue was whether the homeowner’s policy covered the loss. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and, in a divided decision, the Court of Appeals reversed in part.
The policy excluded losses “resulting from any manufacturing, production or operation, engaged in … the growing of plants.” The parties agreed that the fire resulted from the rewiring of the electrical system, but disagreed on “whether that means the damage” “result[ed] from” “the growing of plants.” The Court held that “resulting from” “broadly links a factual situation with the event creating liability, and connotes only a minimal causal connection or incidental relationship.” In doing so, it equated the terms “results from” and “arising from.” Concluding that a “common sense” approach was to be used, it found a “minimal causal connection” to be present. This expansive standard could be beneficial to policyholders in arguing the causal connection between COVID-19 and ensuing business interruption losses; specifically, that the pandemic, a covered event, is the underlying and proximate cause of the insureds’ physical loss and/or damage and the insured’s resulting business interruption loss, and that intervening events, whether they be orders of civil authority, prevention of ingress/egress or otherwise, would not sever the chain of causation.
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Scott P. DeVries, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. DeVries may be contacted at sdevries@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
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