Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Massachusetts Pulls Phased Trigger On Its Statute of Repose

December 21, 2020 — Kyle Rice - The Subrogation Specialist
In D’Allesandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC, 486 Mass 150, 2020 Mass. LEXIS 721, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered a certified question regarding how to apply the Massachusetts statute of repose, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B, in regards to phased construction projects. The court held that, in this context, the completion of each individual “improvement” to its intended use, or the substantial completion of the individual building and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner or owners, triggers the statute of repose with respect to the common areas and limited common areas of that building. Additionally, the court held that where a particular improvement is integral to, and intended to serve, multiple buildings (or the development as a whole), the statute of repose is triggered when the discrete improvement is substantially complete and open to its intended use. In D’Allesandro, the action arose out of the construction, marketing, sale and management of the Hewitts Landing Condominium (the Condominium) project. Ultimately, 150 units were constructed over 24 phases of construction, enclosed in 28 different buildings. Throughout construction, the project’s architect submitted declarations to the Town of Hingham swearing that the individual units were “substantially complete” and could be occupied for their intended use. The Town of Hingham then issued certificates of occupancy for the unit or building. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kyle Rice, White and Williams
Mr. Rice may be contacted at ricek@whiteandwilliams.com

Avoiding Disaster Due to Improper Licensing

February 18, 2019 — Candace Matson - Construction & Infrastructure Law Blog
IT’S NOT ENOUGH FOR A CONTRACTOR TO BE LICENSED . . . it must be properly licensed. We are reminded of this by the recent case of JMS Air Conditioning and Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica Community College District, Bernards Bros., Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 945 (2018). In that case, JMS entered into an $8.2M subcontract with Bernards to install an HVAC system in a new facility being built for the District. JMS held a C-20 warm-air heating, ventilating and air-conditioning license. A year into the project, Bernards sought permission from the District to substitute another subcontractor for JMS (as required under Public Contract Code Section 4107 for listed subcontractors on public works of improvement). Among other things, Bernards contended that JMS was not properly licensed to perform that portion of the work which consisted of hydronic plumbing and hydronic boiler work. JMS countered that this work was an integral part of installing an HVAC system, and relied on Business & Profession Code Section 7059, which permits work that is “incidental and supplemental to the performance of the work for which the specialty contractor is licensed,” and a California State Licensing Board regulation which defines “incidental and supplemental” as meaning “essential to accomplish the work in which the contractor is classified.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, §831.) Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Sheppard Mullin
Ms. Matson may be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com

Appraisers May Determine Causation

January 21, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
In a case of first impression, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that an appraisal may determine issues of causation. North Glenn Homeowners Association v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 854 N.W. 2d 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). On July 15, 2009, North Glenn Homeowners Association submitted a claim to State Farm for hail damage on the roof. The claim was paid. North Glenn did not repair all of the damage, instead deciding to use some of the money to make other repairs to the property. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

BWB&O is Recognized in the 2024 Edition of Best Law Firms®!

November 16, 2023 — Dolores Montoya - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP is honored to announce the firm has been recognized for its fourth consecutive year in the 2024 edition of Best Law Firms® and is ranked by Best Lawyers® regionally in three practice areas. To read the publication, please click here. Regional Tier 1 Las Vegas: Litigation – Construction Orange County: Litigation – Construction Regional Tier 2 Orange County: Family Law Regional Tier 3 Orange County: Commercial Litigation Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP

Washington Court of Appeals Upholds Standard of Repose in Fruit Warehouse Case

August 04, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

On July 28, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Clasen Fruit & Cold Storage v. Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. that more than six years had passed since a contractor had concluded work and so granted a summary dismissal of the suit.

Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. (F&M) was contracted to construct several buildings for Clasen Fruit and Cold Storage. These were completed in March, 1999. The buildings suffered wind damage to the roofs in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006. In the first two incidents, F&M repaired the roofs with Clasen paying for repairs.

In 2005, Clasen hired Continuous Gutter to make repairs. The final incident was the collapse of the roof of one building. This was attributed to “excessive moisture in the roof’s vapor barriers.” At this point, Clasen demanded that F&M pay for repair and replacement costs. In 2008, Clasen sued F&M for damages for breach of contract and negligent design and construction of the roof.

The decision then covered the meanings, in Washington law, of “termination of services” and “substantial completion.” The panel concluded that construction was “substantially completed in 1997” and “relevant services” by 2001. “But Clasen did not sue until 2008, some seven years after termination of any roof related services.”

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Do Municipal Gas Bans Slow the Clean Hydrogen Transition in Real Estate?

June 06, 2022 — Sidney L. Fowler, Robert G. Howard & Emily Huang - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog
Clean hydrogen has the potential to play a significant role in the energy transition by serving as a carbon-free form of energy storage and heat production. In real estate, hydrogen could provide heating, replace or supplement natural gas in many applications, or store excess rooftop solar power. The United Kingdom, United States and Japan are all homes to pilot projects attempting to scale out hydrogen for use in communities. As we have discussed previously, many cities have recently passed ordinances banning the inclusion of natural gas infrastructure in new commercial and residential buildings. These bans can create headaches for real estate developers and inject uncertainty into development plans. Reprinted courtesy of Sidney L. Fowler, Pillsbury, Robert G. Howard, Pillsbury and Emily Huang, Pillsbury Mr. Fowler may be contacted at sidney.fowler@pillsburylaw.com Mr. Howard may be contacted at robert.howard@pillsburylaw.com Ms. Huang may be contacted at emily.huang@pillsburylaw.com Read the court decision
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Gone Fishing: Tenant’s Insurer Casts A Line Seeking To Subrogate Against The Landlord

October 17, 2022 — William L. Doerler - The Subrogation Strategist
In J&J Fish on Ctr. Str., Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-644-bhl, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16361, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (District Court) recognized that “[t]here will be no further fish fries on Center Street until someone pays to repair the collapsed floor at J&J Fish on Center Street, Inc. (J&J Fish).” The contenders were: 1) J&J Fish; 2) its’ insurer, Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company (Insurer); and 3) J&J Fish’s landlord, Vision Land, LLC (Vision). Recognizing Insurer’s right to subrogate against Vision based on the terms of the parties’ lease, the District Court held Insurer owed J&J Fish coverage for the losses it sustained, but that Insurer could subrogate against Vision for anything it had to pay J&J Fish. In J&J Fish, Vision and J&J Fish signed a lease (Lease) for a building (the Building) located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Lease required Vision to “purchase and keep in full force and effect on the building(s) . . . insurance against fire and such other risks as may be included in all-risks policies . . .” Vision, however, never obtained any insurance on the Building. Pursuant to the Lease, Vision also agreed to “maintain and repair the structure including the slab floor and exterior walls of the Premises.” With respect to J&J Fish, the Lease required J&J Fish to maintain “Physical Damage insurance, including but not limited to fire . . . and all other risks of direct physical loss as insured . . . for the full replacement cost of all additions, improvements (including leasehold improvements) and alterations to the Premises.” J&J Fish purchased a commercial property and casualty insurance policy (the Policy) from Insurer. The Policy covered “additions, improvements . . . and alterations” as the Lease required. In addition, it insured the Building itself against “collapse,” subject to certain exceptions. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com

The Year 2010 In Review: Design And Construction Defects Litigation

February 25, 2011 — Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale

This article is the first in a series summarizing construction law developments for 2010

1. Centex Homes v. Financial Pacific Life Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995 (E.D. Cal. 2010)

After settling numerous homeowners’ construction defect claims — and more than ten years after the homes were substantially completed — a home developer brought suit against one of the concrete fabrication subcontractors for the development seeking indemnity for amounts paid to the homeowners, as well as for damages for breach of the subcontractor’s duties to procure specific insurance and to defend the developer against the homeowners’ claims. The subcontractor brought a motion for summary adjudication on the ground the developer’s claims were barred by the ten year statute of repose contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15.

The District Court agreed the developer’s claim for indemnity was barred by Section 337.15. And it held that because the damages recoverable for breach of the subcontractor’s duty to purchase insurance are identical to the damages recoverable through the developer’s indemnity claim, the breach of duty to procure insurance claim also was time-barred. The District Court, however, allowed the claim for breach of the duty to defend to proceed. The categories of losses associated with such a claim (attorneys’ fees and other defense costs) are distinct from the damages recoverable through claims governed by Section 337.15 (latent deficiency in the design and construction of the homes and injury to property arising out of the latent deficiencies).

2. UDC — Universal Development v. CH2M Hill, 181 Cal. App. 4th 10 (6th Dist. Jan. 2010)

Indemnification clauses in construction agreements often state that one party to the agreement — the “indemnitor” — will defend and indemnify the other party from particular types of claims. Of course, having a contract right to a defense is not the same as actually receiving a defense. Any indemnitor attempting to avoid paying for defense costs can simply deny the tender of defense with the hope that when the underlying claim is resolved the defense obligations will be forgotten. In the past, when parties entitled to a defense — the “indemnitees” — had long memories and pressed to recover defense costs, indemnitors attempted to justify denying the tender by claiming their defense obligations coincided with their indemnity obligations and neither arose until a final determination was made that the underlying claim was one for which indemnity was owed.

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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. Ms. Matson can be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com, Mr. Hamersmith can be contacted at hhamersmith@sheppardmullin.com, and Ms. Lauderdale can be contacted at hlauderdale@sheppardmullin.com.