Used French Fry Oil Fuels London Offices as Buildings Go Green
December 10, 2015 —
Siobhan Wagner – BloombergPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s office above Charing Cross railway station in London is cooled, heated and fueled by an unlikely source: used cooking oil.
The system, which helped the property become the greenest building in the U.K. capital, uses oil refined less than two miles away at London Bridge. It also helps prevent an invisible problem: “fatbergs” formed when oils dumped in drains and pipes congeal with baby wipes and diapers and block the city’s sewers.
“We’re using London’s waste to fuel a London office building,” said Jon Barnes, head of building at PwC. The system contributed toward a one-third reduction in electricity costs after a two-year refurbishment of the One Embankment Place office building that finished last year.
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Siobhan Wagner, Bloomberg
Texas EIFS Case May Have Future Implications for Construction Defects
October 02, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLennar Homes addressed a problem with EIFS in homes built in Texas in the 1990s by replacing every roof they had built. Some of those homes had problems with leaks, rotting, or termites, but other roofs hadn’t suffered any problems. Lennar’s insurers initially refused coverage. Lennar managed to settle with all but one, Markel American Insurance.
Their dispute formed the case Lennar Corp. v. Markel American Insurance Co. This was first tried before a jury and eventually appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Brian S. Martin of Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons LLP discusses this case at Insurance Journal.
Markel’s claim was that under the policy language, Lennar could not make voluntary payments without getting Markel’s consent, which they did not. But the Texas Supreme Court disagreed, determining that Lennar took, as Mr. Martin notes, “a reasonable approach to a serious problem.”
Markel also made the claim that the whole amount of the damages was not covered by the policy, as they did not view the policy as covering the cost of determining the extent of the damage. The Court disagreed, noting that “under no reasonable construction of the phrase can the cost of finding EIFS property damage in order to repair it not to be considered ‘because of the damage.’”
Mr. Martin concludes by calling the Texas Supreme Court decision “a frontal assault on several critical provisions of liability policies that will assuredly lead to further litigation.” He also notes that the decision “may indicate a shift in the Court’s approach in insurance cases to a more result-oriented jurisprudence.”
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Texas Federal Court Upholds Professional Services Exclusion to Preclude Duty to Defend
March 16, 2020 —
Jeremy S. Macklin - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn Project Surveillance, Inc. v. The Travelers Indemnity Company, No. 4:19-CV-03324, 2020 WL 292247 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2020), a Texas federal court held that a professional services exclusion in a commercial general liability policy precluded Travelers’ duty to defend its insured.
The underlying lawsuit was a wrongful death action brought by the family of a worker killed on a construction site. Project Surveillance was present at the construction site “to provide safety supervision or other services.” The underlying lawsuit alleged that Project Surveillance negligently failed to inspect or adequately inspect the project and failed to warn or adequately warn the decedent of a dangerous condition. The underlying lawsuit also alleged that Project Surveillance was negligent in failing to stop work.
At the time of the incident, Project Surveillance had commercial general liability insurance through Travelers and professional liability insurance through RLI. RLI agreed to defend Project Surveillance in the underlying lawsuit. Travelers, however, denied owing a duty to defend or indemnify based on an exclusion for “bodily injury” arising out of the rendering or failure to render any “professional service.” The Traveler policy defined the term “professional services” to mean any service requiring specialized skill or training, including “failure to prepare [. . .] any warning,” “supervision,” “inspection,” “control,” “surveying activity or service,” “job site safety,” “construction administration,” and “monitoring [. . .] necessary to perform and of [those] services.”
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Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub LiebermanMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
MTA Debarment Update
December 02, 2019 —
Steven M. Charney, Gregory H. Chertoff & Paul Monte - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Alliance for Fair and Equitable Contracting Today, Inc., a nonprofit formed by five trade associations, including the GCA, the BTEA and the NY Building Congress, has sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority over rules that debar contractors for delays and cost overruns on MTA projects without regard to the reasons for the delays and cost overruns.
As described in our prior client alert (see
here), the current rules automatically debar firms that are determined to have gone over the MTA approved contract price or time by more than 10%. The rules do not consider mitigating circumstances. Delays and cost overruns are often caused by unforeseen conditions, design errors and omissions, and changes requested by the MTA. The MTA’s rules could lead contractors to absorb additional costs they shouldn’t be responsible for rather than face the risk of being debarred. As argued in Alliance’s action, “Debarment is the death penalty for a public works contractor, and not just in New York. A debarment by the MTA could result in debarment nationwide, given that public and private contractors throughout the country commonly inquire about bidders’ debarment history when considering project bids. The Debarment Statute and MTA Regulations thus effectively export an unreasonable law not only throughout New York State, but to all other states as well.”
Reprinted courtesy of Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. attorneys
Steven M. Charney,
Gregory H. Chertoff and
Paul Monte
Mr. Charney may be contacted at scharney@pecklaw.com
Mr. Chertoff may be contacted at gchertoff@pecklaw.com
Mr. Monte may be contacted at pmonte@pecklaw.com
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Maybe Supervising Qualifies as Labor After All
May 22, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember back in 2021 when I
“mused” about Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland et al.? Remember how the Eastern District of Virginia held that mere supervision does not qualify as “labor” under the federal
Miller Act? Well, the 4th Circuit recently weighed in on the appeal of that case and had some interesting things to say about the definition of labor.
As a quick reminder, Plaintiff worked as a project manager on a project to repair and upgrade certain stairs at the Pentagon. Plaintiff subcontracted with prime contractor Forney Enterprises Inc. on this project. On Dec. 20, 2018, the prime contract was terminated. Plaintiff filed the Miller Act suit on Feb. 5, 2020. Dickson alleged that Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, or F&D, must pay him, pursuant to the Miller Act, the amount he is owed for the labor he performed on the project. Now before the district court were cross-motions for summary judgment. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claims, the district court examined the defendant’s claims that (1) Dickson’s work did not qualify as “Labor” under the Miller Act, and (2) that the suit was not timely filed. The Eastern District of Virginia court agreed with both arguments.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Fourth Circuit Clarifies What Qualifies As “Labor” Under The Miller Act
May 08, 2023 —
Jeffrey Hummel - The Construction SeytUnder the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131 et seq., contractors hired to work on federal construction projects are required to furnish payment bonds in order to ensure payment to certain persons that provide labor for the project. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently issued a published decision clarifying the type of work that qualifies as “labor” under the Miller Act. Elliot Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company (issued April 26, 2023).
In that case, the U.S. Department of Defense hired Forney Enterprises (Forney) as the prime contractor on a renovation project at the Pentagon. Forney retained Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) to provide the required Miller Act payment bond. Forney then entered into a subcontract with Elliott Dickson (Dickson), a professional engineer, to work as a project manager on the contract. Dickson primarily supervised labor on the site, but also performed other tasks, including logistical and clerical duties, taking various field measurements, cleaning the worksite, moving tools and materials, and sometimes even watering the concrete himself. Dickson’s work required him to be onsite on a daily basis.
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Jeffrey Hummel, SeyfarthMr. Hummel may be contacted at
jhummel@seyfarth.com
Significant Victory for the Building Industry: Liberty Mutual is Rejected Once Again, This Time by the Third Appellate District in Holding SB800 is the Exclusive Remedy
December 15, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman & Ravi R. Mehta – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin I. Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Certified for Publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District recently elaborated on the scope of the Right to Repair Act, commonly known as SB-800 (“Act”). In
Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Kevin Hicks, et al.) (certified for publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), the Court considered whether the Act (and specifically the Act’s pre-litigation procedure) applies, when homeowners plead construction defect claims based only on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Act (
Civil Code §896). The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The homeowners of seventeen (17) single-family homes filed a Complaint against the builder of their homes, Elliott Homes, Inc. (“Elliott”), alleging common law causes of action for construction defects. Elliott filed a motion to stay the litigation on the ground that the homeowners failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the homeowners that this pre-litigation procedure did not apply because the homeowners had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. Elliott appealed. The Court of Appeal purely considered the question of whether the Act, including its pre-litigation procedure, applies when a homeowner pleads construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, and not on statutory violations of the Act’s building standards.
To answer this question, the Court analyzed a recent case decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. In this subrogation case, a builder’s insurer asserted common law causes of action (but not statutory building standard violations) alleging construction defects against the builder to recover amounts paid to the homeowner after a sprinkler system failure caused extensive damage to the subject property. The trial court sustained the builder’s demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it was time-barred under the Act. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order, holding that common law construction defect claims arising from actual damages are not covered by the Act because “the Act does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases where actual damage has occurred.” (
Liberty Mutual, 219 Cal.App.4th 98, 109).
The
Elliott Court declined to follow
Liberty Mutual, finding that that Court failed to properly analyze the language of the Act. The
Elliott Court analyzed both the statutory scheme and the legislative history of the Act to arrive at the conclusion that common law causes of action for construction defects do indeed fall within the purview of the Act.
According to the
Elliott Court, the Act “broadly applies to
any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in…residential construction and in such an action, a homeowner’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of the standards set forth in the Act, except as specified.” Further, the Act expressly provides that “no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed.”
Civil Code §943(a). In turn,
Civil Code §944 allows for a recovery for the cost of repairing a building standard violation, or for the cost of repairing any damage caused by such a violation, among other things.
The limited exceptions to the Act’s applicability concern the enforcement of a contract, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. Civil Code §943(a). Additionally, the Act does not apply to condominium conversions. Civil Code §896.
The Elliott Court explains that apart from these exceptions, the Legislature intended the Act to apply to all construction defect claims (regardless of damage) relating to the construction of residential properties whose sales contracts are signed after January 1, 2003. There is no exception in the Act, express or implied, for common law causes of action.
Next, the Court turns to the Act’s legislative history to buttress this conclusion. This history makes clear that the Act is a legislative response to the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, that construction defects in residential properties are only actionable in tort when actual property damage manifests. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings indicate that the Act was the product of protracted negotiations between varying interested parties, including construction industry trade groups and consumer protection groups. The Legislature intended (1) to promulgate building standards, violations of which would be actionable, even without damage, and (2) to allow homeowners to recover for actual damage caused by construction defects not covered by the building standards. In other words, the Act was intended to provide homeowners redress regardless of whether damage had manifested.
Therefore, the Court concluded that common law causes of action for construction defects, regardless of damage, are subject to the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its earlier order, and to enter a new order granting Elliott’s motion to stay the litigation until the homeowners (and Elliott) have satisfied the pre-litigation procedure of the Act.
II. McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132
Similar to the Third Appellate District Court’s ruling in
Elliott, the Fifth Appellate District Court also rejected the holding of
Liberty Mutual in a matter now pending before the California Supreme Court:
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132 (review granted and opinion superseded sub nom.
Albany v. Superior Court 360 P.3d 1022). Also similar to
Elliott, in
McMillin a group of homeowners filed common law construction defect claims against the builder of their homes. The builder,
McMillin, moved to stay the litigation pending compliance with the Act’s pre-litigation procedure. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act does not apply because the homeowners have not asserted statutory building standard violations contained within the Act.
In reasoning substantially similar to that of
Elliott, the
McMillin Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s holding that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for pursuing construction defect claims, with or without damage. Thus, the
McMillin Court issued a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s earlier order and to enter a new order granting McMillin’s motion to stay.
On November 24, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the homeowners’ petition for review. In August of 2016, briefing was completed and the matter is now awaiting the scheduling of arguments. CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the pending appeal of this matter to the California Supreme Court, as well as all related developments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Ravi R. Mehta, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Mehta may be contacted at rmehta@cgdrblaw.com
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20 Wilke Fleury Attorneys Featured in Sacramento Magazine 2020 Top Lawyers!
August 24, 2020 —
Wilke FleuryCongratulations to Wilke Fleury’s featured attorneys who made the Sacramento Magazine’s Top Lawyer List for 2020!
Each attorney has been awarded an accolade in the following practice areas:
Kathryne Baldwin – Insurance
Dan Baxter – Business Litigation & Government Contracts
Adriana Cervantes – Medical Malpractice
Heather Claus – Health Care
Aaron Claxton – Health Care
Dan Egan – Bankruptcy and Creditor/Debtor
Samson Elsbernd – Employment & Labor
Danny Foster – Litigation Insurance
David Frenznick – Construction & Construction Litigation
George Guthrie – Real Estate & Construction Litigation
Ron Lamb – Medical Malpractice
Neal Lutterman – Medical Malpractice
Steve Marmaduke – Business/Corporate & Real Estate
Gene Pendergast – Estate Planning & Probate
Mike Polis – Health Care
Matthew Powell – Business Litigation
Bianca Samuel – Employment & Labor
Shannon Smith-Crowley – Legislative & Governmental Affairs
Spencer Turpen – Medical Malpractice
Steve Williamson – Business Litigation & Bankruptcy and Creditor/Debtor
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Wilke Fleury
