AI-Powered Construction Optioneering Today
April 08, 2024 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessIn this episode of the AEC Business Podcast, Aarni Heiskanen interviews René Morkos, the founder and CEO of ALICE Technologies. They discuss construction tech, AI, and ALICE Core, the company’s latest product launch.
How the Construction Technology Landscape has Changed
The construction tech industry has evolved significantly since 2015, as discussed with René.
In 2015, there was a lack of understanding and reluctance toward construction tech, with some investors even hesitant to invest in the sector. However, by 2017-2018, there was a noticeable shift as construction tech became a sought-after investment opportunity.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
Environmental Suit Against Lockheed Martin Dismissed
August 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFA federal judge dismissed an environmental suit against Lockheed Martin, finding that contamination levels on the plaintiffs’ Moorestown, New Jersey properties were not high enough to pose a health threat, according to the New Jersey Law Journal.
Two owners who live across the street from the plant had “sued under the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act and various state statutes.” However, “while the suit was pending, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection raised the threshold for concentration levels of substances such as TCE and PCE to warrant additional testing.”
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Statutory Bad Faith and an Insured’s 60 Day Notice to Cure
April 11, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA recent case came out in favor of an insured and against a first-party property insurer in the triggering of a statutory bad faith action. Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demase v. State Farm Florida Insurance Company, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D679a (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
held that if an insurer pays a claim after the 60-day notice to cure period provided by Florida Statute s. 624.155(3), this “constitutes a determination of an insurer’s liability for coverage and extent of damages under section 624.155(1)(b) even when there is no underlying action.”
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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New York Court Rejects Owner’s Bid for Additional Insured Coverage
September 06, 2021 —
Eric D. Suben - Traub LiebermanTenders for additional insured coverage in construction accidents are frequently litigated in New York courts. Although the past few years have seen changes in the law regarding the causal nexus between the named insured’s work and coverage for the purported additional insured, courts often find there is at least a duty to defend the additional insured where there are allegations of the employer/subcontractor’s presence at the site.
An exception is the recent decision in Gemini Insurance Company v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, Index No. 652669/20 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (Lebovits, J.). In that case, Gemini insured the owner and general contractor of a construction project, and Lloyd’s insured the injured claimant’s employer under a policy endorsed to provide additional insured coverage to entities who “have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement” with the named insured that they must be “added as additional insured.” Although the court found that the contracts here satisfied this requirement for additional insured coverage, the court’s analysis did not end there.
Noting that even where such contract exists, the Lloyd’s policy would not provide additional insured coverage “in all circumstances” (emphasis in original), the court next considered whether the underlying injury was “caused in whole or in part by: 1. [The named insured’s] acts or omissions, or 2. The acts or omissions of those acting on [the named insured’s] behalf,” as required under the endorsement’s wording.
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Eric D. Suben, Traub LiebermanMr. Suben may be contacted at
esuben@tlsslaw.com
Another (Insurer) Bites The Dust: Virginia District Court Rejects Narrow Reading of Pollution Exclusion
September 10, 2018 —
Michael S. Levine & Latosha M. Ellis - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn a victory for policyholders, and an honorable mention for Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, a federal judge in Virginia ruled that the dispersal of concrete dust that damaged inventory stored in an aircraft part distributor’s warehouse was a pollutant, as defined by the policy, but that it also constituted “smoke” as that term was defined in the dictionary, thereby implicating an exception to the policy’s pollution exclusion. The Court then granted summary judgment for the policyholder, who had suffered a $3.2 million loss.
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Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Latosha M. Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
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How California’s Construction Industry has dealt with the New Indemnity Law
October 22, 2014 —
Mark S. Himmelstein, Esq. - Newmeyer & DillionIt has been almost two years since the California legislature enacted changes to the state’s indemnity law affecting commercial construction contracts. Although we do not yet have any court opinions analyzing the new statutes, the attorneys at
Newmeyer & Dillion now have real world experience in negotiating such indemnity provisions. It is time to evaluate how the construction community has reacted to the changes. In this article, we examine the practical applications of the new law to various construction agreements.
Enacted on January 1, 2013, the new legislation was the latest in a series of efforts by subcontractors and their insurers to eliminate “Type I” indemnity clauses. Under a Type I provision, a subcontractor has a duty to indemnify the developer or general contractor for the negligence of the developer or general contractor or other subcontractors, in addition to the negligence of the subcontractor itself. In 2006, the law was changed to preclude Type I provisions regarding “For Sale” residential construction defect claims. At that time, there was no such restriction enacted for commercial construction contracts. However, since then, commercial subcontractors have been seeking similar legislation. Their efforts culminated in the 2013 revisions regarding commercial contracts.
Commercial Subcontracts
Pursuant to the new indemnity statute — Civil Code section 2782.05 — we have revised our clients’ commercial subcontracts to:
(a) Eliminate the requirement that the subcontractor indemnify the general contractor for the general contractor’s “active negligence;” and
(b) Include the subcontractor’s options for defending claims for which they have an indemnity obligation.
Many subcontractors have responded: “Hey, wait a minute, the new legislation eliminated Type I indemnity so you (general contractor) cannot still require any indemnification for the general contractor’s negligence”. Well, that might be the rumor in subcontractor circles, but the new statute does not eliminate indemnity for the general contractor’s passive fault. In addition, the Civil Code lists 13 instances where the new indemnity restrictions do not apply.
Residential Subcontracts
The legislature did not make anyone’s job easier by drafting a different indemnity provision for commercial subcontracts than for residential subcontracts. In fact, the residential and commercial statutes are different in several critical respects. First, the restrictions on indemnity in the residential statute apply only to construction defect claims in newly constructed “For Sale” houses. The statute does not preclude Type I indemnity provisions for any other claims arising out of residential subcontracts. In contrast, the indemnity restrictions in the commercial statute apply to all claims arising out of commercial subcontracts. In addition, the commercial statute allows indemnity for the general contractor’s passive fault. Since some subcontractors on “residential” projects perform off-site “commercial” work as well, we have amended even residential subcontracts to address the subcontractors’ various indemnity obligations for different parts of their work (e.g., residential work versus commercial work).
Owner-Contractor Agreements
The January 1, 2013 new indemnity provisions apply not only to subcontracts, but also to owner-contractor agreements. Civil Code section 2782(c)(1) precludes indemnity for an owner’s active negligence. Interestingly, the exclusions contained in Civil Code section 2782.05 for subcontracts do not apply, and the statute does not provide contractors with the option of defending claims set forth in the sections concerning subcontracts. Therefore, we have revised the indemnity provisions in owner-contractor agreements to exclude indemnity for the owner’s active negligence.
Design Professional Agreements
The 2007 revisions with respect to “For Sale” residential contracts (discussed above), and the 2013 revisions for commercial contracts do not apply to design professionals. The new indemnity statute concerning commercial subcontracts specifically excludes design professionals from the “anti-indemnity” benefits provided to subcontractors. Therefore, Type I indemnity provisions are fair game and can still be included in design professional contracts.
Conclusion
In sum, Civil Code sections 2782 et seq. now contain an increasingly complex framework for indemnity rules in construction contracts. For example, there is one set of rules for “For Sale” residential construction defect claims (no indemnity for the developer’s active or passive negligence), another for any other claims arising out of residential construction (Type I indemnity is permitted), another for commercial subcontracts (no indemnity for the general contractor’s active negligence, but indemnity for the general contractor’s passive negligence unless any of the exceptions apply, in which case Type I indemnity is permitted), and yet another for commercial owner contractor agreements (no indemnity for the owner’s active negligence, but indemnity for the owner’s passive negligence with no exceptions).
California’s indemnity laws are complex, and rumors as to the impact of the new legislation have made it even more difficult to negotiate these provisions. It is imperative that indemnity clauses in construction contracts clearly delineate the obligations for the specific type or types of work contemplated by the contract. The legislature’s attempt to simplify indemnity obligations has actually made such provisions lengthier and more cumbersome. As experienced construction attorneys, our task is to draft indemnity provisions that comply with the laws, address potential claims, and are understandable.
Mr. Himmelstein is a partner in the Newport Beach office of Newmeyer & Dillion and practices in the areas of construction, real estate, business and insurance litigation. He also specializes in drafting and negotiating construction and real estate contracts. Mark can be reached at mark.himmelstein@ndlf.com.
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Policy Language Matters: New Jersey Court Bars Cleanup Coverage Under Broad Policy Terms
May 15, 2023 —
Stacy M. Manobianca - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. The New Jersey Appellate Division in
Handy & Harman v. Beazley USA Services, Inc., provided clarity regarding the interpretation of the Prior or Pending Litigation Exclusion in a site-specific environmental liability insurance policy.
In Handy & Harman, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination that the insurer was not required to defend or indemnify its policyholder, a metal etching company. The court held that the Prior or Pending Litigation Exclusion (which applied to prior litigation and prior claims) barred coverage for natural resource damages sought in the current litigation because (1) an Administrative Consent Order (“ACO”) is a claim; and (2) the underlying lawsuit was based on the same environmental contamination as addressed in the ACO.1
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Stacy M. Manobianca, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Manobianca may be contacted at
SManobianca@sdvlaw.com
