Florida Courts Say that Developers Are Responsible for Flooding
July 31, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Florida Supreme Court recently handed down a decision that developers can be held responsible if problems with infrastructure lead to damage to homes. Aaron Kase, writing on Lawyers.com, reviews the case, noting that the court said that “habitability of a home is impacted by stagnant standing water and the erosion of soil upon which the home is constructed. One need not wait until floodwaters inundate the home or the erosion swallows the residential structure to find protection.”
Kase notes that a trial court “sided with the developers’ argument that because the water infrastructure didn’t immediately support the houses, implied warranties of fitness and habitability shouldn’t apply and they shouldn’t be liable.” This was overturned at the district court, with the Supreme Court upholding the district court decision. Lisa Wilcox of Wilcox Law notes that “the Supreme Court determined that the warranty of habitability should be applied to protect home buyers from defects in the construction of these essential services even though they are not part of a home’s completed structure.”
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Court Denies Insurer's Motion to Dismiss Collapse Claim
January 20, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiFacing yet another collapse claim based upon alleged poorly mixed cement, the Federal District Court in Connecticut denied the insurer's motion to dismiss. Oliveria v. Safeco Ins Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147256 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2019).
In 1993, the insureds' purchased their home that had been built in 1986. Safeco insured the property. In February 2017, the insureds noticed that the basement walls had a series of cracks. They consulted professionals and learned that the cracking was due to a chemical compound found in certain concrete walls constructed in the late 1980s with concrete most likely from the J. J. Mottes Concrete Company.
The insureds submitted a claim to Safeco for the substantial impairment to the structural integrity of their basement walls. Safeco denied the claim. The insureds filed suit. Safeco moved to dismiss.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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A Property Tax Exemption, Misapplied, in Texas
June 18, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelIn an important ruling for Texas businesses, the Texas Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that the TCEQ misapplied the Texas property tax’s exemption for specified pollution control equipment.
Since 1993, the Texas Constitution has included a provision which authorizes the Texas Legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation “all or part of real and personal property used … wholly or partly … for the control or reduction of air, water or land pollution.” This provision is implemented by Section 11.31 of the Texas Tax Code, which is administered by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. (See the rules at Title 30, Chapter 17 of the Texas Administrative Code.) If the Executive Director of the TCEQ determines that the equipment is used wholly or partly for pollution control, he issues a “positive use determination”; in the event it does not, the Executive Director issues a “negative use determination and rejects the application for the exemption. In 2007, Section 11.31 was amended at 11.31 (k) to list several items of equipment that are presumed to be pollution-control equipment, including “heat recovery steam generators” or HRSGs. This equipment is used by powerplants to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions that are the product of generation of electricity. Several applications were submitted to the TCEQ by the Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, seeking a tax exemption for its HRSG units. In July 2012, the TCEQ denied these applications, with the flat declaration that HRSGs are not pollution-control equipment—“they are used solely for production.” The Brazos Cooperative sued the Commission, and on May 3, 2019, in the case of Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. TCEQ, the Texas Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion reversing the Commission, and the lower court (the Eight Court of Appeals, sitting in El Paso) that affirmed the Commission’s action.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Project Completion Determines Mechanics Lien Recording Deadline
April 08, 2024 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe California mechanics lien is one of the most powerful collection remedies available to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers who are unpaid for work performed and materials supplied in relation to a California private works construction project. The mechanics lien allows the claimant to actually sell the property where the work was carried out in order to obtain payment, entirely of course, against the wishes of the property owner. There are a number of important steps to follow and timelines to be met in order to pursue this remedy.
First, Understand Your Preliminary Notice Deadline
Working within deadlines is absolutely crucial to preserving mechanics lien rights under California law. The deadlines differ, depending on whether you are a “direct” contractor, also known as “original” or “prime” contractor (one who contracts directly with the property owner) or a subcontractor or material supplier. The process begins with the serving of a “preliminary notice” no later than 20 days after the party serving the preliminary notice begins supplying labor or materials to the project. Direct contractors are only required to serve the preliminary notice on the construction lender (Civil Code section 8200-8216), whereas subcontractors and material suppliers must serve not only the construction lender, but also the owner and direct contractor (see Civil Code section 8200(e)).
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Alaska District Court Sets Aside Rulings Under New Administration’s EO 13795
May 06, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn March 29, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska issued two separate rulings that reversed and set aside energy and environmental decisions made by the current administration, which had revoked decisions made in these same matters by the prior administration. The cases are League of Conservation Voters, et al., v. Trump (concerning the development of oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)) and Friends of Alaska National Wildlife Refuges, et al., v. Bernhardt, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior (which concerns a Land Exchange that would facilitate the construction of a road between two remote Alaska communities when that road would traverse parts of a designated national wilderness).
In the League of Conservation Voters matter, the District Court held that the President’s Executive Order 13795 (released on April 28, 2017), which purported to revoke President Obama’s decisions to withdraw certain OCS tracts from oil and gas exploration and development, was unlawful because it was not authorized by Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). In 2015 and 2016, President Obama issued Presidential Memorandums and an Executive Order withdrawing these particular tracts.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Smart Cities Offer New Ideas for Connectivity
April 05, 2017 —
Jennifer Seward - Engineering News-RecordInnovative, technology-driven communities are being designed and constructed for the next generation—and beyond. Although each of them is uniquely planned, experts say the central theme of connectivity is the key to turning concepts into reality.
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Jennifer Seward, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Tiny Houses Big With U.S. Owners Seeking Economic Freedom
July 16, 2014 —
Nina Glinski – BloombergDoug Immel recently completed his custom-built dream home, sparing no expense on details like cherry-wood floors, cathedral ceilings and stained-glass windows -- in just 164 square feet of living space including a loft.
The 57-year-old schoolteacher’s tiny house near Providence, Rhode Island, cost $28,000 -- a seventh of the median price of single-family residences in his state.
“I wanted to have an edge against career vagaries,” said Immel, a former real estate appraiser. A dwelling with minimal financial burden “gives you a little attitude.” He invests the money he would have spent on a mortgage and related costs in a mutual fund, halving his retirement horizon to 10 years and maybe even as soon as three. “I am infinitely happier.”
Dramatic downsizing is gaining interest among Americans, gauging by increased sales of plans and ready-made homes and growing audiences for websites related to the niche. A+E Networks Corp. will air, beginning today, “Tiny House Nation” a series on FYI that “celebrates the exploding movement.”
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Nina Glinski, BloombergMs. Glinski may be contacted at
nglinski@bloomberg.net
