SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?

March 17, 2011 — Shaun McParland Baldwin

The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.



In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.



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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com

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Shifting the Risk of Delay by Having Float Go Your Way

July 05, 2021 — Christopher J. Brasco & Matthew D. Baker - ConsensusDocs
Critical path delay plays a central role in allocating responsibility for project delay. The interrelated concept of concurrency is also frequently determinative of entitlement on a range of claims including by owners for liquidated damages and by contractors for delay damages. What constitutes critical/concurrent delay, however, is hotly debated by scheduling experts. The lack of real consensus regarding how critical/concurrent delay should be determined and analyzed has created significant uncertainty in scheduling disputes. Indeed, courts have adopted differing and at times conflicting theories of concurrency that can produce divergent outcomes for the parties. In an effort to reduce uncertainty, stakeholders have increasingly adopted specialized contractual provisions and scheduling techniques which have significant implications for the evaluation of the companion concepts of criticality and concurrency. One such mechanism is float sequestration. Regardless of whether float sequestration is ultimately in the construction industry’s broader interest, stakeholders must be able to recognize its use and appreciate the implications for delay disputes on their projects. Simply defined, float is the number of days an activity can be delayed before affecting the project’s critical path (i.e., the longest chain of activities which determines the project’s minimal duration). Typically, only delays affecting the critical path can produce concurrent delay. Consequently, the concept of float is integral to understanding and resolving issues of both criticality and concurrency. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher J. Brasco, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP and Matthew D. Baker, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP Mr. Brasco may be contacted at cbrasco@watttieder.com Mr. Baker may be contacted at mbaker@watttieder.com Read the court decision
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Insurer Ordered to Participate in Appraisal

March 27, 2023 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The court found that the insured's request for an appraisal was timely and ordered the insurer to participate. Cloisters of Naples, Inc v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6884 (M.D. Flag. Jan. 13, 2023). A hurricane damaged Cloisters, a condominium. Cloisters made a claim under its commercial insurance policy with Landmark. Landmark acknowledged coverage but failed to pay what Cloisters thought was needed. Cloisters sued. The policy had a standard appraisal provision, but another clause had a suit litigation provision requiring a request for appraisal within two years after physical loss to the property. The dispute was whether Florida law, allowing appraisal clauses to be valid for 130 years, or Georgia law, which had no such extension on requesting an appraisal. Landmark contended the contract was formed in Georgia, so its law should apply. Florida followed the lure of lex loci, which provided that the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed governed. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Supreme Court of Oregon Affirms Decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al.

April 20, 2011 — Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFF

After reviewing the decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al., the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that a tort claim for property damage arising from construction defects may exist even when the homeowner and the builder are in a contractual relationship.



When the case was initially filed, the plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that one, the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and two, no special relationship (such as one between a doctor and patient) existed. The court agreed with the defendants. However, the Court of Appeals while affirming the trial court’s decision on breach of contract reversed the decision on negligence. The Court of Appeals stated that an administrative or statute rule could establish a standard of care independent from the contract.



The Oregon Supreme Court gave an example of cases where a tort claim could exist when a contract is present: “If an individual and a contractor enter into a contract to build a house, which provides that the contractor will install only copper pipe, but the contractor installs PVC pipe instead (assuming both kinds of pipe comply with the building code and the use of either would be consistent with the standard of care expected of contractors), that failure would be a breach of contract only. […] If the failure to install the copper pipe caused a reduction in the value of the house, the plaintiff would be able to recover that amount in an action for breach of contract. […] On the other hand, if the contractor installed the PVC pipe in a defective manner and those pipes therefore leaked, causing property damage to the house, the homeowner would have claims in both contract and tort. […] In those circumstances, the obligation to install copper instead of PVC pipe is purely contractual; the manner of installing the pipe, however, implicates both contract and tort because of the foreseeable risk of property damage that can result from improperly installed pipes.”



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Bad Faith Claim For Independent Contractor's Reduced Loss Assessment Survives Motion to Dismiss

January 28, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The insured's bad faith claim based upon the insurer's alleged use of an independent contractor to assess the amount of loss in order to lower the amount paid survived a motion to dismiss. Williamson v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178022 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2013). The insureds' home was damaged. Chubb, their insurer, retained an independent contractor, Eastern Diversified Services (EDS) to assess the amount of loss. EDS estimated the loss to be $193,270.43, and Chubb paid this amount. Chubb's standard practice was to conduct damage estimates itself using an estimating program called Symbility. EDS used a different program with a data base creating lower payments for loss. When this was brought to Chubb's attention, Chubb refused to recalculate the plaintiff's estimate. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases

September 01, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.

Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.

The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”

The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.

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Second Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of NY’s Zero Emissions Credit Program

November 21, 2018 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
On September 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the “Zero Emissions Credit” (ZEC) program of the New York Public Service Commission is not unconstitutional. The case is Coalition for Competitive Electricity, et al. v. Zibelman, Chair of the New York Public Service Commission, et al. In effect, the ZEC program provides subsidies to qualifying New York nuclear power plants as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The ZEC program is intended to prevent nuclear plants from being prematurely retired from generating power until suitable replacement facilities are operating. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

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The Coverage Fun House Mirror: When Things Are Not What They Seem

December 14, 2020 — Randy J. Maniloff - White and Williams LLP
When it comes to commercial general liability coverage, sometimes things are not what they seem. Some policy language looks like it has a clear meaning. But it turns out that there is more than meets the eye. To see this, you need not look further than the first page of the commercial general liability form. Take its insuring agreement. Its words are by now etched in stone tablets. But even so. Any potential coverage is tied, in part, to damages because of “bodily injury.” Everyone knows what “bodily injury” is. The blood and broken bones are hard to miss. But is emotional injury bodily injury? Or what about hair loss, weight loss, fragile fingernails, loss of sleep, crying or a knot in your stomach? Courts have been required to address whether all of these are “bodily injury.” And was that “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence?” as required by the CGL insuring agreement? An “occurrence” is defined as an accident. Of course everyone knows what an accident is. Then why is it the oldest and most litigated coverage question of them all, with courts struggling with it for about 150 years? Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Randy J. Maniloff, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Maniloff may be contacted at maniloffr@whiteandwilliams.com

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