Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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The A, B and C’s of Contracting and Self-Performing Work Under California’s Contractor’s License Law
July 19, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogThe California Contractors State License Board issues licenses in three general classifications:
- Class A – General Engineering Contractors;
- Class B – General Building Contractors; and
- Class C – Specialty Contractors of which there are currently 42 different Class C specialty contractors license types.
Each of these license classifications has separate contracting rules, and rules regarding when work can be self-performed, which for many can be confusing.
Minor Work Exception
One important (albeit “minor”) exception is that no contractor’s license is required no matter what type of work is being performed if the project has a value of less than $500. Known as the “minor work exception,” the exception is a project-based, not work-based, exception. Thus, for example, if a project owner is remodeling their kitchen at a cost of $6,000 and the cost of doing the flooring is only $300, the person doing the flooring would need to have a contractor’s license in the appropriate classification since the aggregate cost of the work is $500 or more.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Florida Lien Law and Substantial Compliance vs. Strict Compliance
April 20, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThere are literally some (or, perhaps, many!) disputes that will make you say “hmm!” The “hmm” is a euphemism for “what is a party thinking?!?” The case of Trump Endeavor 12 LLC v. Fernich, Inc., 42 Fla. L.Weekly D830a (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) is one of these cases because a party (the owner) is banking its defense on a technical “all-or-nothing” argument pertaining to whether a lienor (a supplier) substantially complied with Florida’s Lien Law because a supplier’s Notice to Owner identified the wrong general contractor. This is a challenging argument because the owner has to prove how they were adversely affected / prejudiced by the lack of substantial compliance, which is not an easy burden.
This case concerns the Trump National Doral Miami project. The project consisted of a lodge project and a separate clubhouse project, both of which had different general contractors. On the lodge project, the general contractor hired a painter which, in turn, procured paint from a supplier (the lienor). The supplier visited the project and obtained the Notice of Commencement from the owner so that it could perfect its lien rights. The owner furnished the supplier the Notice of Commencement for the clubhouse project that had a different general contractor. Relying on this Notice of Commencement, the supplier served a Notice to Owner. The Notice to Owner was timely serviced however it identified the wrong contractor – it identified the general contractor for the clubhouse project instead of the lodge project. Although the supplier later learned there was a different general contractor on the lodge project, it did not remedy the issue by serving a Notice to Owner on the correct contractor. Indeed, the contractor for the lodge project learned of the Notice to Owner furnished by the supplier and that the supplier was furnishing paint to the painting subcontractor for purposes of that project.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
London's Walkie Talkie Tower Voted Britain's Worst New Building
September 03, 2015 —
Neil Callanan – BloombergThe skyscraper at 20 Fenchurch Street in the City of London, nicknamed the Walkie Talkie, is the worst new building in Britain, according to a panel assembled by Building Design magazine.
The 37-story tower, designed by Rafael Vinoly, was made famous two years ago when a beam of light reflected from the building melted parts of a Jaguar sports car. The problem has since been remedied by developers Land Securities Group Plc and Canary Wharf Group Plc.
It is a challenge finding anyone who has something positive to say about this building,” Thomas Lane, editor of the magazine for architects, said in a statement on Thursday. “Londoners now have to suffer views of this bloated carbuncle crashing into London’s historic skyline like an unwelcome guest at a party from miles away.”
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Neil Callanan, Bloomberg
Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
July 30, 2019 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistArkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision.
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Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
The Dog Ate My Exclusion! – Georgia Federal Court: No Reformation to Add Pollution Exclusion
September 28, 2017 —
Philip M. Brown-Wilusz - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.While schoolchildren know that the classic “the dog ate my homework” excuse doesn’t work, insurance companies are willing to try a variation of that excuse. Ace American Insurance Company (Ace), sold a property policy (the Policy) to Exide Technologies, Inc. (Exide). Exide sought coverage under the Policy for acid damage at its former battery factory. Ace denied coverage, citing to the pollution exclusion. The only problem? The Policy contained no pollution exclusion!
Exide had procured policies from other insurers for several years prior to the inception of the Policy, all of which contained pollution exclusions. Exide instructed Marsh USA Inc. (Marsh), its broker, to procure insurance “on the same or better terms and conditions.” The resulting policy contained no pollution exclusion, and Exide sought coverage under the Policy for pollution-related losses.
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Philip M. Brown-Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Brown-Wilusz may be contacted at
pbw@sdvlaw.com
The Pandemic, Proposed Federal Privacy Regulation and the CCPA
November 02, 2020 —
Heather Whitehead - Newmeyer DillionThe U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation met recently to discuss considerations for implementing federal privacy laws. Not surprisingly, the main impetus to reevaluate a federal framework is the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic with the greatly increased reliance on online working and school arrangements, as well as the need to share personal information for contact tracing and other efforts to weaken the pandemic.
While federal regulation of personal information has been proposed in the past, there are a few key issues that still remain unresolved. One is enforcement of the regulations. The issue is whether enforcement should be handled by the Federal Trade Commission or if the establishment of a new federal authority is needed to enforce privacy requirement violations. Other key outstanding issues include pre-emption of state rights and whether any regulations should include a private right of action.
Given that the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) is the most stringent state regulation addressing data privacy in the United States, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra participated as a witness in the recent Senate Hearing. He shared his opinions as to both federal pre-emption and the need for a private right of action. He recommended that the committee preclude federal regulation from pre-empting state laws, including the CCPA. He noted that individual states are in a better position to adapt and keep up with technological innovation, and that some states have also already implemented thorough privacy protections, such as Mississippi and Washington. With respect to the private right of action, he admitted his office can only do so much to enforce these regulations amongst California’s huge population of businesses and residents. His belief is that individual consumers need the ability to pursue their own remedies in court.
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Heather Whitehead, Newmeyer DillionMs. Whitehead may be contacted at
heather.whitehead@ndlf.com
New Jersey Judge Found Mortgage Lender Liable When Borrower Couldn’t Pay
August 06, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to the New Jersey Law Journal, Freedom Mortgage Corporation has to pay treble damages and legal fees after Bergen County Superior Court Judge Gerald Escala found the company “liable under New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act for providing a home refinance loan to a 70-year-old borrower it should have known would be unable to make the payments.”
“Escala further ruled that Freedom Mortgage must hold off on obtaining a foreclosure judgment for a year to allow an opportunity for borrower Mamie Major to look for someone to buy the property or to obtain refinancing elsewhere,” the New Jersey Law Journal reported.
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