Sometimes a Reminder is in Order. . .
June 21, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRecently, I was talking with my friend Matt Hundley about a recent case he had in the Charlottesville, VA Circuit Court. It was a relatively straightforward (or so he and I would have thought) breach of contract matter involving a fixed price contract between his (and an associate of his Laura Hooe) client James River Stucco and the Montecello Overlook Owners’ Association. I believe that you will see the reason for the title of the post once you hear the facts and read the opinion.
In James River Stucco, Inc. v. Monticello Overlook Owners’ Ass’n, the Court considered Janes River Stucco’s Motion for Summary Judgment countering two arguments made by the Association. The first Association argument was that the word “employ” in the contract meant that James River Stucco was required to use its own forces (as opposed to subcontractors) to perform the work. The second argument was that James River overcharged for the work. This second argument was made without any allegation of fraud or that the work was not 100% performed.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 —
CDCoverage.comIn Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Florida trigger
August 04, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Siena Home Corp., No. 5:08-CV-385-Oc-10GJK (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2011), insured residential real estate developer Siena was sued by homeowners seeking damages for moisture penetration property damage resulting from exterior wall construction defects. Siena’s CGL insurer Mid-Continent filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of no duty to defend or indemnify in part on the basis that the alleged “property damage” did not manifest during the Mid-Continent policy period.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Design Immunity Does Not Shield Public Entity From Claim That it Failed to Warn of a Dangerous Condition
May 17, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogReaders of this blog are familiar with the concept of the design immunity defense.
Codified at Government Code section 830.6, it provides in pertinent that a public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a plan or design of a public improvement where the plan or design has been “approved in advance . . . by the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved” if the trial or appellate court finds that there “is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor.”
In the next case, Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Case No. B293670 (January 29, 2021), the 2nd District Court of Appeal examined whether the design immunity defense also serves as a defense to a claim that a public entity has a duty to warn of a dangerous condition on public property.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
COVID-19 Case Remanded for Failure to Meet Amount in Controversy
September 14, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court remanded to state court a loss of rent claim because the amount in controversy requirement was not met. Geragos & Geragos Fine Arts Bldg., LLC v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 2020 U.S Dist. LEXIS 127427 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2020).
Geragos suffered loss of rental income due to the COVID-19 tenant relief measures implemented in Los Angeles. The tenant relief orders would remain in effect for the duration of the emergency period, the end date of which was not presently set.
Geragos submitted a claim for loss of rental income to Travelers. When the claim was denied, Geragos sued in state court. Travelers removed to federal district court. Geragos moved to remand the case back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Connecticut Supreme Court to Review Several Issues in Asbestos Coverage Case
November 08, 2017 —
Ciaran Way & Robert F. Walsh – White and Williams LLPOn October 18, 2017, in R.T. Vanderbilt Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, the Connecticut Supreme Court certified four issues for appeal, which relate to trigger, allocation, pollution exclusions, and the occupational disease exclusion in the context of asbestos bodily injury claims. This post identifies the issues the Connecticut Supreme Court will decide on appeal and sets forth the Appellate Court’s ruling on each issue.
Issue 1: Whether a “continuous trigger” theory of coverage applies to asbestos-related disease claims and whether expert medical testimony on the timing of injury should be precluded
The Appellate Court applied a continuous trigger, and found that the trial court properly excluded testimony from medical experts the insurers had proffered to prove that the asbestos disease process did not support a continuous trigger.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ciaran Way, White and Williams LLP and
Robert Walsh, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Way may be contacted at wayc@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Walsh may be contacted at walshr@whiteandwilliams.com
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The Future Has Arrived: New Technologies in Construction
October 17, 2022 —
Sarah Biser - ConsensusDocsThe construction industry has traditionally been slow to adapt to new technologies, but things are changing.
Construction companies are keen to control costs (including increased costs due to supply chain issues), improve efficiency, maintain productivity while dealing with labor shortages, and enhance safety, and protect data bases from cyberattacks. New technologies, including robotics, 3D printing, cloud and mobile computing, augmented reality, blockchain, and cybersecurity, are helping construction companies achieve those goals.
Here are some key takeaways.
Augmented Reality (AR) vs. Virtual Reality
Augmented Reality is a technology that superimposes a computer generated image upon a user’s view of the real work. Virtual Reality, on the other hand, creates a virtual environment to replace the real one.
AR has uses in many industries. For example, shoppers using AR can see what furniture or appliances will look like in their own homes and offices. Medical professionals can also use the technology to visualize organs and simulate procedures prior to operations.
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Sarah B. Biser, Fox Rothschild LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Biser may be contacted at
sbiser@foxrothschild.com