SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Legal Implications of 3D Printing in Construction Loom

July 10, 2018 — Aldo E. Ibarra - Engineering News-Record
Imagine a printer in the middle of a construction site programmed with a designer’s plans and specifications to build an entire home from scratch. As concrete is fed into the printing device, a technician hits enter on her computer and a 3D printer starts fabricating the structure’s walls and roof. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Aldo E. Ibarra, ENR
ENR staff may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com

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Brown Act Modifications in Response to Coronavirus Outbreak

March 30, 2020 — Gregory J. Rolen - Haight Brown & Bonesteel
Gov. Gavin Newsom waived certain provisions of the Bagley-Keene Act and Ralph M. Brown Act to make state and local legislative bodies safer while allowing California public entities to conduct business. In an effort to promote social distancing and slow the spread of the coronavirus pandemic Gov. Newsom issued Executive Order N-25-20. The Executive Order authorizes state and local legislative bodies, such as school district and county office of education governing boards, to more easily hold public meetings by way of teleconference. The order took further steps to make public meetings accessible to the public via electronic means, including telephone. The Brown Act generally requires legislative body members, a clerk, or other personnel to be physically present in a meeting in order to participate or establish a quorum. Executive Order N-25-20 temporarily eliminates this requirement. Furthermore, standard Brown Act requirements such as publicly noticing the teleconference location for each meeting participant is also suspended. Clearly, this is an attempt to protect the public, as well as Board members and staff, by temporarily discouraging large group settings in the conduct of the public’s business. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Gregory J. Rolen, Haight Brown & Bonesteel
Mr. Rolen may be contacted at grolen@hbblaw.com

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Repairs Commencing on Defect-Ridden House from Failed State Supreme Court Case

October 15, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
In the Windmill Harbour area of Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, Danielle Smith is repairing her home after “spending almost $25,000 on unsuccessful legal battles and two years to secure a loan,” according to the Beaufort Gazette. The contractor who custom built the home was unlicensed, and “[t]he synthetic stucco used to build the house was faulty, causing water damage throughout that will cost $500,000 and six months to repair.” Back in 2008, Smith’s case reached the state Supreme Court. The court ruled against her, reasoning “that the former owner, who had hired subcontractors to build the house, could not be held liable for the damage because he built it as a private home and had originally intended to never sell it.” Read the court decision
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Miller Act and “Public Work of the Federal Government”

March 01, 2017 — David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal Updates
The Miller Act applies to the “construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the Federal Government.” 40 U.S.C. s. 3131. A recent opinion out of the Northern District of Oklahoma sheds light on what the Miller Act means regarding its application to any public work of the Federal Government. See U.S. v. Bronze Oak, LLC, 2017 WL 190099 (N.D.Ok. 2017). If the project is not a public works project of the Federal Government, the Miller Act does not apply. In this case, the Department of Transportation entered into an agreement with the Cherokee Nation where the Department would provide lump sum funding and the Nation would use the money to fund transportation projects. Based on the federal funding, the Nation issued a bid for a transportation project in Mayes County, Oklahoma and the project was awarded to a prime contractor. The prime contractor provided a payment bond that identified the United States as the obligee (as a Miller Act payment is required to do) and stated that it was issued per the Miller Act. Thereafter, the Nation and Mayes County, Oklahoma entered into a Memorandum of Understanding where the County would assume responsibility for the construction and maintenance of the project and the Nation would pay the County an agreed amount upon the completion of the project. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dadelstein@gmail.com

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Care, Custody or Control Exclusion Requires Complete and Exclusive Control by Insured Claiming Coverage

July 30, 2019 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In McMillin Homes Construction v. Natl. Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (No. D074219, filed 6/5/19) a California appeals court held that a “care, custody or control” exclusion did not bar coverage for defense of a general contractor as an additional insured under a subcontractor’s policy, because the exclusion requires exclusive control, but the facts and allegations posed a possibility of shared control with the subcontractor. McMillin was the general contractor on a housing project and was added as an additional insured to the roofing subcontractor’s policy pursuant to the construction subcontract. The homeowners sued, including allegations of water intrusion from roof defects. McMillin tendered to the roofing subcontractor’s insurer, which denied a defense based on the CGL exclusion for damage to property within McMillin’s care, custody or control. In the ensuing bad faith lawsuit, McMillin argued that the exclusion required complete or exclusive care, custody or control by the insured claiming coverage, which was not the case for McMillin. The insurer argued that the exclusion said nothing about complete or exclusive care, custody or control. Further, the intent to exclude coverage for damage to any and all property in McMillin’s care, custody or control, to whatever degree, was demonstrated by the fact that the additional insured endorsement in question was not an ISO CG2010 form, but a CG2009 form, which expressly adds a care, custody or control exclusion to the additional insured coverage not found in the CG2010 form. The argument was that the CG2009 form evidences an intent to conclusively eliminate coverage for property in the additional insured’s care, custody or control. In addition, the insurer argued that this result was also reinforced by its inclusion of an ISO CG2139 endorsement in the roofer’s policy, which eliminated that part of the “insured contract” language of the CGL form, defining an “insured contract” as “[t]hat part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to your business . . . under which you assume the tort liability of another party to pay for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to a third person or organization.” The insurer’s argument was that by having eliminated coverage for contractual indemnity or hold harmless agreements, it had “closed the loop” of eliminating additional insured coverage for construction defect claims. Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases

September 01, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.

Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.

The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”

The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.

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Hunton Insurance Recovery Partner Michael Levine Quoted on Why Courts Must Consider the Science of COVID-19

March 15, 2021 — Latosha M. Ellis & Matt Revis - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
One year into the COVID-19 pandemic, courts have issued hundreds of rulings in COVID-19 business interruption lawsuits, many favoring insurers. Yet those pro-insurer rulings are not based on evidence, much less expert opinion evidence. For insurers, ignorance is bliss. Despite early numbers in federal courts favoring insurers (state court decisions actually favor policyholders), the year ahead holds promise for policyholders. Fundamental science is the key. Indeed, as researchers continue to broaden their knowledge about COVID-19, it has become increasingly clear that scientific evidence supports coverage for policyholders’ claims. Reprinted courtesy of Latosha M. Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Matt Revis, Hunton Andrews Kurth Ms. Ellis may be contacted at lellis@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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The Need to Be Specific and Precise in Drafting Settling Agreements

December 30, 2013 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
The case of Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Corp., 2013 WL 452374 (D. Colo. February 6, 2013) is instructive as an example of both the confusion and resulting escalation of litigation that can result from a lack of clarity in settlement negotiations. This is particularly true where parties settle outside of their insurance coverage, and/or without notifying their insurer(s), which have denied coverage. The case involved coverage litigation following settlement of a multi-party construction defect case involving the Rivergate multi-family residential development in Durango, Colorado. The condominium owners association sued, among others, the developer (Rivergate Lofts Partners, hereafter “RLP”) and the general contractor (Genex Construction, LLC, hereafter “Genex”). This follow-on case involved the insurers for RLP (“Hartford”) and Genex (“Bituminous”). The coverage dispute was complicated by the Bituminous allegations that Hartford insured Genex in its alleged role as a manager for RLP, as part of Hartford’s insurance of RLP more generally. The underlying facts were that Hartford denied insurance coverage and defense to Genex/Bituminous. The underlying construction defect case went to mediation, with the COA, RLP, and Genex all in attendance with their respective insurer representatives, and coverage counsel. While the evolving facts of that mediation were later disputed as to their motives, intentions, and the contemporaneous knowledge of the parties, the facts reflected in documents were fairly clear. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com

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