Broker Not Negligent When Insured Rejects Additional Coverage
January 31, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe broker was not negligent when it proposed additional coverage that was rejected by the insured. Cromer v. Rosenzweig Ins. Agency Inc., 2017 N.Y. App Div. LEXIS 8969 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 21, 2017).
Plaintiff was injured while employed as a painter at property owned by Allen Skriloff. Coverage was denied because injuries to employees, contractors and employees of contractors were excluded. Plaintiff sued Skriloff and obtained a jury verdict of $6.1 million. Skirloff assigned to plaintiff all rights and claims held against the insurer and insurance brokers.
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Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Client Alert: Design Immunity Affirmative Defense Not Available to Public Entities Absent Evidence of Pre-Accident Discretionary Approval of the Plan or Design
April 15, 2014 —
R. Bryan Martin & Melinda M. Carrido – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPOn April 8, 2014, in Martinez v. County of Ventura, Case No. B24476, the Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal reversed the jury's defense verdict for the County of Ventura, holding that the County's evidence in support of its Design Immunity defense to a public property dangerous condition claim was insufficient as a matter of law.
Plaintiff filed suit against the County of Ventura (the "County") after sustaining paraplegic injuries when his motorcycle struck an asphalt berm abutting a raised drain (the top-hat drain system) on a road in the County. The drain system consisted of a heavy steel cover on three legs elevated eight to ten inches off the ground, with a sloped asphalt berm to channel water into the drain.
Plaintiff alleged that the top-hat drain system constituted a dangerous condition of public property pursuant to California Government Code section 835. Under this Section, a public entity is liable for "injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained, and the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury to have taken preventative measures." The jury found the top-hat drain system constituted a dangerous condition of public property.
Reprinted courtesy of
R. Bryan Martin, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Melinda M. Carrido, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com; Ms. Carrido may be contacted at mcarrido@hbblaw.com
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Policy Lanuage Expressly Prohibits Replacement of Undamaged Material to Match Damaged Material
March 09, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiConstruing an all-risk Businessowners Policy, the court found that the policy language did not required replacement of undamaged material match materials that were damaged. Pleasure Creek Townhomes Homeowners' Ass'n v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2019 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1095 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019).
The policy covered the Association's 14 townhome buildings. In June 2017, a hail storm damaged siding on all 14 buildings. An appraisal panel included the cost to replace the undamaged, faded siding in its appraisal award so that it would match the new siding. American Family refused to pay this component - which was appraised at about $211,382 - of the award.
An exclusion in the policy provided,
We will not pay to repair or replace undamaged material due to mismatch between undamaged material and new material used to repair or replace damaged material.
We do not cover the loss in value to an property due to mismatch between undamaged material and new material used to repair or replace damaged material.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Equitable Subrogation Part Deux: Mechanic’s Lien vs. Later Bank Deed of Trust
September 15, 2016 —
Kevin J. Parker – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThis post follows, almost two years to the day, Rick Erickson’s post of August 29, 2014. As noted by Rick Erickson in his August 29, 2014 post, the Arizona Supreme Court in the Weitz case (2014) had determined that equitable subrogation principles were applicable to enable an earlier-recorded mechanic’s lien to be trumped by a later-recorded bank deed of trust, if the loan secured by the later deed of trust paid off a lien that had been ahead of the mechanic’s lien. In a decision filed August 9, 2016, the Arizona Court of Appeals further clarified the scope of such equitable subrogation.
In Markham Contracting Co., Inc. v. FDIC, No. 1 CA-CV 14-0752 (August 9, 2016), the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a first-recorded deed of trust was followed by a second-recorded mechanic’s lien; and then, after the mechanic’s lien was recorded, a new lender made a secured construction loan that was used, in part, to pay off the loan that was secured by the first-position deed of trust. The key being “in part.” The subsequent lender loaned $4.8 million, but only $2.9 million went to pay off the balance owing on the first-position deed of trust.
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Kevin J. Parker – Snell & WilmerMr. Parker may be contacted at
kparker@swlaw.com
Luxury-Apartment Boom Favors D.C.’s Millennial Renters
August 27, 2014 —
Heather Perlberg – BloombergMandy Johnson was priced out of Virginia Square Towers, a luxury-apartment building rising across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., where about $3,000 a month would bring perks such as a swimming pool, yoga studio and a game room with virtual golf and zombie dodge ball.
Less than 24 hours after declining to sign the contract in June, she got an e-mail from a leasing manager offering two months’ free rent. That brought the monthly payment down for Johnson and her roommate by about $450 over the term of the lease and put the place within reach.
“The building is still under construction, so we have to deal with that part, but we are also able to have this brand new apartment for the same price as one in older buildings, so we went for the shiny object,” said Johnson, 28, who works at a nonprofit that gives scholarships to military families.
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Heather Perlberg, BloombergMs. Perlberg may be contacted at
hperlberg@bloomberg.net
Builders Beware: A New Class Of Defendants In Asbestos Lawsuits
January 06, 2016 —
David J. Byassee, Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP & Timothy A. Gravitt, Ulich, Ganion, Balmuth, Fisher & Feld, LLPResidential, commercial and industrial builders face new and potentially significant liability for construction activities that took place in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s: personal injury lawsuits filed by construction workers from exposure to building products containing asbestos. After emptying the pockets of manufacturers and suppliers of raw asbestos and asbestos-containing products over the last 20 years, plaintiff lawyers are beginning to set their sights on a new class of defendants in asbestos litigation: residential, commercial and industrial builders who unknowingly allowed asbestos-containing products to be incorporated into their projects.
The men and women who have been involved in the building industry for 40 years or more may remember the subject of asbestos surfacing in the 1970s with the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). At that point builders were just beginning to learn that asbestos was a component of some building materials, and the potential risk of cancer presented by asbestos was being debated in scientific and medical journals. Although the use of building materials containing asbestos was mostly phased out by the 1980s, the health risks associated with exposure to asbestos continue – and in fact increase – for the duration of an exposed person’s life.
Today it is generally accepted that exposure to asbestos increases the risk of developing asbestosis and certain kinds of cancer, including mesothelioma. Cancers associated with exposure to asbestos are typically diagnosed at least 15 years (and sometimes up to 50 years) after a person’s exposure to asbestos, meaning that exposures in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s might not manifest in disease until now. The class of persons who may be at risk for asbestos-related disease is long and varied: insulators, HVAC installers, pipe fitters, plumbers, drywall installers, painters, plasterers and roofers, to name a few. Long-term exposure history, coupled with the theory that “each and every” exposure during a lifetime is a substantial factor increasing the risk of developing cancer, presents potential liability to builders acting as general contractors and/or property owners, as well as the usual defendants in asbestos lawsuits, which include manufacturers, suppliers, and users of asbestos-containing materials.
In recent years, plaintiff lawyers have set their sights on builders as the financial wherewithal of traditional asbestos defendants has dried up. Plaintiff lawyers have created a new theory of liability which they use to rope builders in as defendants in asbestos lawsuits: that the builder knew – or should have known – that a deadly ingredient (asbestos) was contained in the building materials used in construction, and the builder failed to warn its subcontractors or anyone else on the project that exposure to asbestos could harm them.
Builders have unique legal defenses to claims brought by employees of subcontractors who have developed asbestos-related disease. For example, the California Supreme Court in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, held that an injured employee of a subcontractor cannot maintain a claim against the hirer (builder) for the employee’s injury absent affirmative contribution on the part of the builder to the injury. Thus the first line of defense in an asbestos exposure case is to argue that the developer had no direct role in the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos and therefore the Privette doctrine precludes the plaintiff from suing the builder. But resourceful plaintiff lawyers are coming up with arguments to get around this so-called Privette defense in asbestos lawsuits by claiming that builders’ activities such as cleanup of asbestos-containing materials, or assertion of control over the work of the subcontractor, directly contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries and therefore provide exceptions to Privette and allow the claim to proceed.
A practical question is raised in asbestos cases: How is a plaintiff able to prove, decades after working on a project, what building materials contained asbestos, or that a builder knew or should have known in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s that asbestos-containing materials were used on their project, or that asbestos presented a health risk? To answer the first part of the question (what building materials contained asbestos), plaintiff’s experts will say that during the relevant timeframe asbestos was a common ingredient in many building products, e.g., drywall joint compounds, stucco/plaster/gun cement, acoustic ceiling products, cement pipe, insulation, roofing mastic, caulk and plumber’s putty; this can be further proven by reference to product manufacturers’ disclosures made pursuant to the Asbestos Information Act. Also, through the decades of asbestos litigation against product manufacturers and suppliers, resourceful plaintiff lawyers have developed vast banks of data and documentation identifying the manufacturers of asbestos-containing building products, the end-users of those products, and the projects where those products were supplied. With this bank of knowledge, all that is necessary for them to make the claim against a builder is to have the plaintiff identify a construction project where he or she remembers working during the relevant timeframe. Once that identification is made, it is a simple matter for the lawyers to dig and find out who developed the building/project, who then becomes a defendant in an asbestos lawsuit.
The answer to the second part of the question (whether the developer knew or should have known that the products brought to their projects contained asbestos) requires a detailed investigation into the dates at which the products were supplied to the project, the manufacturer of the product, and what information was available in the market place about the material content of the particular product.
The answer to the third part of the question (knowledge that asbestos presented a health risk) is trickier. One of the first standards set by OSHA in 1972 related to permissible levels of exposure to asbestos. It is a common tactic for plaintiff lawyers to argue that the existence of OSHA standards created a presumption of knowledge in the building industry about the dangers of asbestos. But what about pre-OSHA knowledge? Here plaintiff lawyers will argue that well before OSHA, going back as far as 1936, exposure to asbestos was regulated in California under General Industry Safety Orders relating to Dusts, Fumes, Mists, Vapors and Gases. They argue that the General Industry Safety Orders put builders “on notice” of the dangers of asbestos by virtue of being regulated by the State of California, and, by extension, builders had “knowledge” of the health risks associated with asbestos.
There are defenses that skilled defense counsel can utilize to defeat asbestos claims, assuming the Privette defense is not available. The first is to thoroughly investigate and evaluate all of the plaintiff’s potential exposures to asbestos throughout his entire lifetime, and identify those sources that likely were the major contributors to his disease. Next, counsel has to properly investigate the project at which the plaintiff is alleged to have been exposed to asbestos, identify all of the possible sources of exposure, i.e., the products that were used or might have been used at the project, and finally how the plaintiff was allegedly exposed at the project. As most builders do not maintain records of what products were used in their projects dating back 15 years or more, let alone the identities of the trades that worked on the projects, knowledgeable defense counsel can be a valuable partner in unearthing the brands of products typically in use in the locale where the construction took place, and identifying the manufacturers of those products. Defense counsel must analyze the frequency, duration, proximity and intensity of the exposure, as well as the type of asbestos the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to (not all asbestos is created equal – some types are more toxic than others). This will involve careful evaluation of the levels of exposure created by the alleged activity of the builder, to determine, through experts and a thorough understanding of the scientific and medical studies on the subject, whether the levels of asbestos exposure created by the activity could be considered a “substantial factor” in contributing to the risk of the plaintiff’s development of his asbestos-related disease.
Asbestos lawsuits present a significant risk to the unsuspecting and unprepared builder. Money damages available to a plaintiff are substantial. Medical expenses for treatment of asbestos-related disease typically run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, lost income (including retirement benefits) can also be significant, and jury awards for pain, suffering and emotional distress can be staggering - often millions of dollars. In some cases punitive damages are even awarded.
The bottom line is that a builder runs a big risk if it treats an asbestos claim like any other claim. The level of analysis and investigation to properly defend against the claim requires prompt action by knowledgeable counsel, and frequently there is no insurance coverage.
David J. Byassee is an attorney with the firm
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP, and is a litigator who has devoted nearly a decade to representation of real estate developers and builders. He can be reached at: dbyassee@bremerwhyte.com.
Timothy A. Gravitt is an attorney with the firm
Ulich, Ganion, Balmuth, Fisher & Feld, LLP who is devoted to defending real estate developers and builders in a variety of litigation. He can be reached at: tgravitt@ulichlaw.com.
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Georgia Supreme Court Determines Damage to "Other Property" Not Necessary for Finding Occurrence
July 31, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiThe Georgia Supreme Court has determined that an "occurrence" may arise under a CGL policy even if "other property" is not damaged. Taylor Morrison Servs. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 2013 Ga. LEXIS 618 (Ga. July 12, 2013).
Taylor Morrison, the insured, was a homebuilder. It was sued in a class action by more than 400 homeowners in California alleging that the concrete foundations of their homes were improperly constructed. This led to water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckled flooring.
At first, HDI-Gerling defended under a reservation of rights. Subsequently, however, HDI-Gerling sued Taylor Morrison in federal district court in Georgia, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to HDI-Gerling after determining that there was no "occurrence" when the only "property damage" alleged was damage to work of the insured. Georgia law was applied to the dispute.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
To Sea or Not to Sea: Fifth Circuit Applies Maritime Law to Offshore Service Contract, Spares Indemnity Provision from Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act
March 29, 2017 —
Richard W. Brown & Afua Akoto – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Faced with the issue of whether maritime or state law should be applied to determine the validity of an indemnity clause in a Master Services Contract (MSC), the Fifth Circuit affirmed that where there is no historical treatment of the contract in question (1), it would consider six factors established in Davis (2).
In Doiron, the Apache Corporation and STS (3) entered a broad-form blanket MSC, under which STS agreed to perform flow-back services, a process designed to dislodge solid objects from inside a well, on Apache’s well located off shore of Louisiana. The MSC also contained an indemnification provision, which required STS to defend and indemnify Apache and its company groups against all claims of property injury or bodily injury. During the flow-back operation, Larry Doiron Inc. (LDI), one of the Apache Company groups, supplied a crane barge for use by STS employees. Subsequently, the crane knocked over an STS employee, causing him to suffer severe injuries. LDI then made a formal demand to STS for defense and indemnification. STS rejected the demand and argued that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act applied to the MSC instead of maritime law. Pursuant to the Act, indemnity clauses in agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas or water are void as against public policy. But, under maritime law, the enforcement of such provisions is not barred. Therefore, if the MSC was construed under the Act, STS had no duty to defend or indemnify LDI.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard W. Brown, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Afua S. Akoto, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Brown may be contacted at rwb@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Akoto may be contacted at asa@sdvlaw.com
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