California Supreme Court Finds that the Notice-Prejudice Rule Applicable to Insurance is a Fundamental Public Policy of the State
October 14, 2019 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. (No. S239510, filed 8/29/19), the California Supreme Court held that California’s notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy in the insurance context, supporting the application of California law under a choice of laws analysis. In addition, the Court held that the rule generally applies to consent (aka “no voluntary payments”) provisions in first party insurance policies but not to consent provisions in third party liability policies.
Pitzer College discovered soils contamination while building a new dormitory. Under pressure to complete construction before the start of the school year, Pitzer proceeded to remediate the soils, incurring $2 million in expense. Pitzer submitted a claim to Indian Harbor, which provided Pitzer insurance covering legal and remediation expenses resulting from pollution conditions discovered during the policy period.
The policy contained a notice provision requiring Pitzer to provide oral or written notice of any pollution condition to Indian Harbor and, in the event of oral notice, to “furnish … a written report as soon as practicable.” In addition, a consent provision required Pitzer to obtain Indian Harbor’s written consent before incurring expenses, making payments, assuming obligations, and/or commencing remediation due to a pollution condition. The consent provision had an emergency exception for costs incurred “on an emergency basis where any delay … would cause injury to persons or damage to property or increase significantly the cost of responding to any [pollution condition],” in which case Pitzer was required to notify Indian Harbor “immediately thereafter.” Lastly, a choice of law provision stated that New York law governed all matters arising under the policy.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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United States Supreme Court Backtracks on Recent Trajectory Away from Assertions of General Jurisdiction in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern
August 01, 2023 —
Charles S. Anderson - Lewis BrisboisWashington, D.C. (June 28, 2023) – On June 27, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion that appears to backtrack on the Court’s steady trajectory away from assertions of general jurisdiction in recent years, e.g. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 2017, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). Relying on a case from 1917, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917), Justice Gorsuch, writing on behalf of the plurality, (Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Jackson) (Justice Alito concurring) found that Norfolk Southern “consented” to jurisdiction in Mallory via 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i),(b) by registering to do business in Pennsylvania. This statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301, specifically permits jurisdiction over a corporation “incorporat[ed] under or qualifi[ed]as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth … for any cause of action that may asserted against him, whether or not arising from acts enumerated in this section.”
In Pennsylvania Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution in connection with a Missouri law that required an out-of-state insurance company desiring to transact any business in the state to file paperwork agreeing to (1) appoint a state official to serve as the company’s agent for service of process and (2) accept service on that official as valid in any suit. After more than a decade of complying with the law, Pennsylvania Fire was served with process and argued that the Missouri law violated due process. The Court unanimously found that there was “no doubt” that Pennsylvania Fire could be sued in Missouri because it had agreed to accept service of process in Missouri on any suit as a condition of doing business there.
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Charles S. Anderson, Lewis BrisboisMr. Anderson may be contacted at
Charles.Anderson@lewisbrisbois.com
Amazon Feels the Heat From Hoverboard Fire Claims
January 20, 2020 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:18CV166-M-P, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189053 (Oct. 31, 2019), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi considered a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon). Amazon argued that, because it was a “service provider” who cannot be held liable under Mississippi’s Product Liability Act (MPLA), Miss. Code § 11.1.63, the negligence and negligent failure to warn claims filed against it by plaintiff State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm) failed as a matter of law. The court, looking beyond the MPLA, held that State Farm’s complaint stated a claim against Amazon.
In State Farm, Taylor and Laurel Boone (the Boones), State Farm’s subrogors, purchased two hoverboards from third parties in transactions facilitated by Amazon. They purchased the first hoverboard on October 31, 2015 and the second on November 10, 2015. The Boones started using the hoverboards on or about December 25, 2015. On March 16, 2016, the hoverboards caught fire and the fire spread to destroy the Boones’ home. As alleged in the amended complaint, the hoverboards were “manufactured by unknown manufacturers from China.” State Farm, as the Boones’ subrogee, filed suit asserting negligence and negligent failure to warn claims against Amazon.
Amazon filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing that State Farm’s claims against it were governed by the MPLA and, as a service provider, it was not liable under the MPLA. In response, State Farm argued that Amazon was liable because it acted as a “marketplace” and that, rather than MPLA claims, Amazon is subject to common law negligence and failure to warn claims. The District Court agreed with State Farm.
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Never, Ever, Ever Assume! (Or, How a Stuck Shoe is Like a Construction Project Assumption)
October 21, 2019 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaThis summer, I had the fortune of taking a trip to Europe. The first place I visited was Amsterdam. A lovely town with a lot of culture and more canals than you can shake a stick at. I was meeting family there, but had hours to kill ahead of time. So, I decided to take the train from the airport into the City Centre, leave my bags at the train station luggage locker, and begin exploring.
My plan took its first misstep when I attempted to board the train. Not being in a hurry, I let the other passengers get on first. Sure, I noticed the train conductor blowing his whistle while I stepped onto the train, but figured I was fine since I was already on the steps up. Until, that is, the door began to close, with me in the doorway, suitcase in the train, one foot inside, and one foot mid step up to the cabin. The door closed on my backpack (which was still on my back), but I managed to force it into the train compartment. My shoe, however, was not quite as lucky. Part of my shoe made it inside, and part was outside the door.
No worry– just look for the door release mechanism, right? Wrong! There was none. The train started up, with my shoe still halfway in and halfway out of the train. (Luckily my foot itself made it inside all in one piece). The conductor came along to scold me, and told me that he could *probably* rescue my shoe once we got to Central Station. In the meantime, I sat on a nearby jump seat, keeping tabs on my shoe and fuming that this was *not* the way I planned to start my vacation. Long story short– the train conductor was able to salvage my shoe, but not without a lot of commentary on how I should never have boarded the train after the whistle blew. Lesson learned.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Preventing Common Electrical Injuries on the Jobsite
February 03, 2020 —
Kelsey Rzepecki - Construction ExecutiveDespite the overall decrease in electrical workplace fatalities, construction workers remain the most at risk of death from electrical accidents. In 2016, 53% of all fatal electrical injuries were in the construction industry, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Employers can improve their bottom line by implementing prevention strategies to reduce chances of electrical injuries and create a safer, more efficient jobsite.
What Are the Most Common Electrical Injuries in Construction?
The three types of electrical injuries that occur the most often on construction jobsites are:
- electrocution (such as electric shock and burns) through unintentional contact with high-voltage lines or equipment;
- severe burns or death from explosive gases accidentally ignited by electrical equipment; and
- injuries from falls or from contact with moving equipment after worker experiences a low-voltage electrical shock and can no longer keep balance or physical control of the tools or equipment they have when shocked.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kelsey Rzepecki, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Ms. Rzepecki may be contacted at
krzepecki@graphicproducts.com
Will a Notice of Non-Responsibility Prevent Enforcement of a California Mechanics Lien?
August 06, 2019 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe “Notice of Non-Responsibility” is one of the most misunderstood and ineffectively used of all the legal tools available to property owners in California construction law. As a result, in most cases the answer to the above question is “No”, the posting and recording of a Notice of Non-Responsibility will not prevent enforcement of a California Mechanics Lien.
The mechanics lien is a tool used by a claimant who has not been paid for performing work or supplying materials to a construction project. It provides the claimant the right to encumber the property where the work was performed and thereafter sell the property in order to obtain payment for the work or materials, even though the claimant had no contract directly with the property owner. When properly used, a Notice of Non-Responsibility will render a mechanics lien unenforceable against the property where the construction work was performed. By derailing the mechanics lien the owner protects his property from a mechanics lien foreclosure sale. Unfortunately, owners often misunderstand when they can and cannot effectively use a Notice of Non-Responsibility. As a result, the Notice of Non-Responsibility is usually ineffective in protecting the owner and his property.
The rules for the use of the Notice of Non-Responsibility are found in California Civil Code section 8444. Deceptively simple, the rules essentially state that an owner “that did not contract for the work of improvement”, within 10 days after the owner first “has knowledge of the work of improvement”, may fill out the necessary legal form for a Notice of Non-Responsibility and post that form at the worksite and record it with the local County Recorder in order to prevent enforcement of a later mechanics lien on the property.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Brief Discussion of Enforceability of Anti-Indemnity Statutes in California
September 10, 2014 —
William M. Kaufman – Construction Lawyers BlogCalifornia Civil Code Section 2782 has been amended numerous times over the last several years. Essentially, Anti-indemnity statutes may not be fully effective for contracts entered into before January 1, 2009. Some developers and general contractors attempted to comply with the new law, and changed the indemnity provisions of their contracts post January 1, 2006. The time bracket, or zone of danger if you will, is between 1/1/06 and 1/1/09—during those three years California Civil Code §2782 was amended several times. After 1/1/09 Type I indemnity is gone in a residential construction context.
The 2005 amendment to Civil Code §2782 rendered residential construction contracts entered into after 1/1/06 containing a Type I indemnity provision in favor of builders unenforceable;
The 2007 amendment added contractors not affiliated with the builder to the list of contracting parties who could not take advantage of a Type I indemnity provision;
However, the 2008 amendment changed the effective date to 1/1/09, dropped any mention of 2006, and added GCs, other subs, their agents and servants, etc., to the list of possible contracting parties who could not take advantage of a Type I indemnity provision[.]
Reprinted courtesy of
William M. Kaufman, Lockhart Park LP
Mr. Kaufman may be contacted at wkaufman@lockhartpark.com, and you may visit the firm's website at www.lockhartpark.com
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Risk Protection: Force Majeure Agreements Take on Renewed Relevance
November 30, 2020 —
Michael E. Carson - Construction ExecutiveForce majeure clauses have been standard in contracts dating back hundreds of years in the United States—and even longer in Europe. “Force majeure,” which is French for “greater force,” removes liability for unforeseen events that prevent parties from fulfilling contractual obligations.
In a year defined by the COVID-19 pandemic, these clauses have gone from boilerplate basics to something worthy of further examination and attention in order to minimize risk for all parties involved in a construction project. Prior to COVID-19, drafters might have considered a localized or regional event that would lead to invoking a force majeure clause. It is doubtful, however, that anybody envisioned the impact on such a world-wide scale.
UNDERSTANDING THE AGREEMENTS
Force majeure clauses cover unforeseen events, a broad term that encompasses both acts of God and human-caused incidents. These range from natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes to acts of terrorism, strikes, political strife, government actions, war and other difficult- or impossible-to-predict disruptions. When such an event occurs, the force majeure clause attempts to remove, or at least reduce, uncertainty as to the rights and liabilities of the parties to the agreement.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael E. Carson, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Mr. Carson may be contacted at
michael.carson@nationwide.com
